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Introduction
The most popular tax subsidy to household saving in the United States is the 401(k)-type
pension arrangement, which subsidizes saving through income-tax deferral on wages and salary
dedicated to retirement saving and through investment accrual at the pre-tax interest rate.
Although enabled by legislation in 1978, 401(k) plans effectively were not adopted until the
Internal Revenue Service issued clarifying rules in 1981. Since then, they have grown
remarkably and become the primary vehicle for retirement saving. In 1996, 33 percent of all
private pension assets, 33 percent of all pension plans, and 45 percent of all active pension
participants were in 401(k)s. The $104 billion in 401(k) contributions represented 61 percent of
all pension contributions and 38 percent of National Income and Product Account (NIPA)
personal saving that year. Benefits paid from 401(k)s represented 38 percent of total pension
benefits disbursed.1
Despite their prominent role, the empirical evidence about their effects on household saving
has been debated heavily. In a series of influential papers, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994a,
1994b, 1995, 1996, 1998a) and Venti and Wise (1996) have argued that 401(k) saving is
predominantly new and not offset by declines in other saving. In contrast, Engen, Gale, and
Scholz (1994, 1996) and Engen and Gale (1996, 2000) argued that 401(k) saving has been offset
significantly by reductions in other saving. Even more striking is that these opposing findings
were estimated using the same data: the 1984, 1987, and 1991 Surveys of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP).
The fundamental difficulty in this literature is that unobserved heterogeneity in household
saving may bias estimated saving effects. For example, some households may be “savers,” others
not. Savers save more in all forms, including 401(k)s, so that a positive correlation between
401(k) participation and high saving is not evidence necessarily of a causal effect. Poterba,
Venti, and Wise (1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1998a) and Venti and Wise (1996) have developed

numerous strategies to circumvent this problem.2

The most convincing is quasi-experimental

and termed “the eligibility experiment” Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995). Because 401(k)s are
employment-based, only employees at firms with a plan are eligible to participate. They argued
that the firm’s adoption is largely exogenous with respect to any given worker’s unobserved taste
for saving.3 Therefore, they estimated the 401(k) saving effect by a comparison of the financial
assets (401(k) assets included) of eligible (the treatment group) and ineligible (the control group)
households in the SIPP. All of the difference in financial assets between the groups was due to
the difference in 401(k) assets. Although their characterization of these findings was that the
bulk of 401(k) wealth was new saving, their estimates clearly implied that 401(k)s raised
household saving dollar-for-dollar.4
One shortcoming of their analysis is the emphasis on financial assets rather than all assets
that finance retirement consumption. Such assets include financial as well as pension and Social
Security assets.5

Unfortunately, the SIPP did not measure the latter sources of wealth. The

current paper adopts the Poterba, Venti, and Wise eligibility experiment framework, but uses
household wealth data from the 1992 Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS surveyed
individuals born between 1931-41 and their spouses (regardless of birth year). It has detailed
data on pension assets (on the current and previous jobs) reported both by the respondent and the
firm. In addition, it has matched Social Security assets from the Social Security Administration
(SSA). It is the only household data source with this information.
The key question is whether 401(k)-eligible households have greater total assets to finance
retirement. I am able to replicate the Poterba, Venti, and Wise findings for financial assets:
eligible households have significantly higher financial assets than ineligible households, and all
of the difference is due to 401(k) assets. However, when the saving measure is broadened to
include all pension assets, there is no difference between eligible and ineligible households using
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the self-reported pension data in the HRS. There is a significant negative correlation between
401(k) and non-401(k) pension assets. In particular, ineligible households self-reported more
assets in defined benefit pensions than eligible households.
However, a comparison of the self- and firm-reported pension data indicates significant nonclassical measurement error in eligibility in the self-reported data that varies with household
income. Lower-to-middle income households understate eligibility. High-income households
overstate eligibility. Furthermore, the measurement error is highly correlated with saving
behavior. Analyses with self-reported eligibility (all of the previous literature) yield estimated
saving effects that are biased upward significantly.
In addition, there is significant measurement error in self-reported pension assets. When
firm-reported pension assets and eligibility are used instead of the self-reported data to address
this measurement error, a different picture emerges. The 401(k)s generate economically large
and sometimes statistically significant household saving effects for lower-to-middle income
households: the average dollar contributed generates between 70 cents and one dollar of new
household saving. However, these saving effects attenuate with income. They are much smaller
economically (and even negative) and not statistically different from zero for middle-to-upper
income households. Over all households, 38 cents of the average dollar of 401(k) wealth
represent new household saving, with an estimated standard error of 16 cents. However, defined
contribution and 401(k) assets derived from the firm-reported data likely significantly overstate
actual values. When the firm- and self-reported plan value data are integrated to better reflect
actual values, a qualitatively similar pattern of large saving effects that decline with income is
found, but the overall impact on household saving is estimated to be minus $0.08, with a
standard error of $0.29, and not statistically different than zero.
Overall, the effect of 401(k)s on household saving is small. All estimates are significantly
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lower than those implied by the Poterba, Venti, and Wise studies but happen to be similar to
those in Engen and Gale (2000). They also contrast with the findings of Engelhardt (1996) and
Venti and Wise (1986, 1990) for other tax subsidies to saving. Although not explored directly in
the current paper, one conceivable explanation that is not inconsistent with this large estimated
offset to household saving is firm-level substitution (either explicit or implicit) of 401(k)s for
other pensions. In addition, even though very little of the average dollar of 401(k) wealth appears
to be new household saving, the best specifications indicate 401(k)s may have stimulated saving
significantly for lower-to-middle income households and, hence, increased retirement income
security for an important segment of the population.
The paper is organized as follows. The next two sections describe 401(k)-type pension
arrangements and the existing evidence on 401(k) saving effects, respectively. The following
section describes the empirical analysis from the HRS. Followed by the discussion of
corroborating firm-level evidence on pension plan substitution. There is also a brief conclusion.
401(k)-Type Pension Arrangements
Unlike Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA’s), 401(k)-type pension arrangements are
employment-based. Only employees of firms that offer these plans are eligible. They are defined
contribution plans and are a subset of Cash or Deferred Arrangements (CODAs). Legally, the
term “401(k)” refers to defined contribution plans qualified under section 401(k) of the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC). However, researchers, policy makers, and the media frequently use this
term loosely to describe plans that offer elective employee pre-tax contributions based on salary
reduction. The array of plans with this feature is remarkably broad. For example, savings or thrift
plans that allow pre-tax contributions from salary reduction must follow rules for 401(k)s. The
same applies to profit-sharing plans. Qualified nonprofit organizations and public school systems
can sponsor elective tax-deferred savings plans under section 403(b) of the IRC. Essentially,
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403(b)s operate like 401(k)s. Plans for state and local government employees qualified under
section 457 of the IRC also have 401(k)-type features.
Their distinguishing feature is they allow employees to make elective contributions on a pretax basis, funded by a reduction in the employee’s salary. Hence, they are referred to frequently
as Salary Reduction Arrangements (SRAs). The employer may contribute as well, often
matching a pre-determined fraction of the employee’s elective contribution. The typical match is
50 percent of employee contributions up to 6 percent of wages and salary. The account funds
accrue at the pre-tax interest rate and are taxed as ordinary income at withdrawal.
Existing Evidence on 401(k) Saving Effects
In a series of influential papers using the 1984, 1987, and 1991 SIPP, Poterba, Venti, and
Wise (1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1998a) and Venti and Wise (1996) developed various
empirical methods to estimate the 401(k) saving effect. Each attempted to minimize the bias
from unobserved heterogeneity. While these methods and the sheer size of their published work
are too large to discuss here, their findings consistently point to a very large 401(k) saving effect:
on the order of a dollar-for-dollar stimulus to household saving. The interested reader is referred
to Bernheim (1997, 1999), Hubbard and Skinner (1996), Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996, 1998a),
and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996) for extensive reviews of these methods.
The most convincing method is the “eligibility experiment” in Poterba, Venti, and Wise
(1995). Employers determine 401(k) eligibility. They argued that firms have adopted them such
that eligibility essentially was random with respect to any given worker. Specifically, they
showed empirically that eligibility differed across income categories but, within income
category, was not correlated with characteristics such as age. They used this to estimate the
saving effect of 401(k)s.
Their empirical strategy was in two parts. First, they compared the total financial assets
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(401(k)s included) of eligible to ineligible households. A necessary condition for a positive
saving effect was that eligible households should have had higher total financial assets than
ineligible households, ceteris paribus. Second, they compared the non-401(k) assets of eligible to
ineligible households. A necessary condition for a positive saving effect was that the non-401(k)
assets of eligible households should have been no different than those of ineligible households,
ceteris paribus. That is, all of the difference in financial assets between the two groups should
have been due to 401(k) assets.
Econometrically, this comparison can be written as
Aai = β a + γ a DiEligible + ε i ,

(1)

where i indexes the household, i=1,...,n, a denotes the asset measure, A is the dollar amount of
assets, DiEligible is a dummy variable that is 1 if the household is eligible for a 401(k) and 0
otherwise, and ε is a random error term. γ measures the effect of eligibility on asset balances. If
eligibility is exogenous, then Cov( D Eligible, ε ) = 0 , and the 401(k) saving effect, γ , can be
estimated consistently. But because Poterba, Venti, and Wise argued that eligibility was
exogenous conditional on income, they estimated these between-group differences controlling
for income. They also controlled for age, education, and marital status. Their regression
specification was
7

7

j =1

j =1

Aai = å β ajYij + å γ aj (Yij ´ DiEligible) +θ ' X i + ε ai

(2)

where X was the vector of demographic characteristics and Yij was an indicator variable that was
1 if household i had income in interval j and 0 otherwise. The asset measures analyzed were total
financial assets, non-IRA-401(k) assets, 401(k) assets, and IRA assets. The income intervals (in
thousands) were less than 10, 10-20, 20-30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-75, and over 75. γ aj is the 401(k)
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saving effect for each asset type and income category, respectively. Now, given income and
demographics, the identifying assumption is

Cov(D Eligible, ε | X ,Y ) = 0 .

(3)

Because the distribution of assets is right-skewed, Poterba, Venti, and Wise estimated the
parameters in (2) with median regression (separately for the 1984, 1987, and 1991 SIPP). The
median regression estimator produces consistent estimates of the 401(k) saving effects (by
income category), γ aj . In addition, these estimates are efficient relative to mean regression. Their
results for 1991 are reproduced in Table 1. It shows the conditional median asset balances for
eligible and ineligible households by asset measure and income category. These balances were
calculated with the parameter estimates from (2) evaluated at the sample mean of the
demographic variables. Eligible households had significantly higher total financial asset balances
than ineligible households. These differences were economically large for all income categories
and statistically significant at the 5 percent level for six of the seven categories. Importantly,
there was little difference between eligible and ineligible households for non-IRA-401(k)
financial assets. In only three of seven categories were the groups statistically different and those
differences were not large economically. This was evidence of no offset within financial-asset
saving.6 Because the non-IRA-401(k) financial assets were the same but the total financial assets
differed due to 401(k) assets, they interpreted this as evidence in favor of a substantial 401(k)
saving effect.
Under this empirical strategy, it was important that eligible and ineligible households did not
differ at the onset of the program (effectively, 1981). The earliest household survey with 401(k)
information was the 1984 SIPP. For 1984, just three years after the IRS clarified plan rules, they
found no difference in non-IRA-401(k) assets between eligible and ineligible households. This
was important supporting evidence of a substantial saving effect.
7

There have been a number of criticisms of this method.7

First, although there was no

substitution within financial assets, there may have been substitution between financial and nonfinancial assets that could have accounted for the asset differences between eligible and
ineligible households Engen and Gale (1996, 2000) and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994, 1996).
For example, as aggregate 401(k) assets rose significantly in the late 1980's, mortgage debt rose
as well. Engen and Gale (1996, 2000) found substitution between 401(k) assets and mortgage
debt in this period using the SIPP. In particular, 401(k)-eligible households had greater financial
assets than ineligible households, but more mortgage debt as well. Strikingly, the two groups did
not differ in terms of total private wealth.8

However, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996, 1998a)

performed a related analysis in the SIPP and concluded the opposite: no substitution between
401(k) assets and mortgage debt.
Second, there may have been substitution between financial assets and public and private
pensions. Almost all estimates of 401(k) saving effects have used the SIPP.9 The SIPP asked
respondents direct questions on 401(k) eligibility, had detailed questions on income and financial
and 401(k) assets, and having started in 1984, roughly covered the expansion of 401(k)s.
However, it had no information on two important components of retirement saving: the present
value of claims to non-401(k) pension plans (i.e., defined benefit and non-401(k) defined
contribution plans) and Social Security.
The private pension omission is problematic. From the description above, it is clear there
were two types of ineligible households. First, there were households with no pension coverage
during their lifetime. Second, there were households that had pension coverage from plans other
than 401(k)s. The linchpin of the quasi-experimental framework above was that eligibility was
exogenous (conditional on income and demographics). But this may not have been true because
401(k) eligibility and other pension coverage may have been correlated inversely if there was
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firm-level substitution of 401(k)s for other pension plans. In principle, such substitution in
combination with substitution of other pension assets for financial assets could have accounted
for positive saving effects estimated in previous studies. For example, ineligible households
might have had greater other pension wealth because many after-tax thrift plans were converted
to 401(k)s in the 1980's Andrews (1992), Papke (1995, 1999). Those assets would have appeared
in the SIPP as 401(k) assets for eligible households but not measured for ineligible households.10
This could have accounted for the asset differences Poterba, Venti, and Wise found. Similarly,
the Social Security omission could have biased the estimated effects if Social Security was
greater for ineligible than eligible households and there was an offset between Social Security
and financial assets.
However, the most frequent criticism has been that eligibility is not exogenous (Engen, Gale,
and Scholz 1994, 1996; Engen and Gale 1996, 2000; Bernheim 1999; Ippolito 1996). Rather, it is
positively correlated with workers’ taste for saving. A number of theoretical explanations have
been put forth. First, workers with a high taste for saving sort themselves to firms that offer
pensions, and, in particular, 401(k)s (Allen, Clark, and McDermed 1993; Curme and Even 1995;
Ippolito 1996; Even and McPherson 1996). Second, firms with 401(k)s may have adopted them
in response to employee interest. This may have been true especially in small firms. In a survey
of firms by Buck Consultants (1989), employee interest was cited as a reason for 401(k) adoption
by 63.5 percent of firms. Finally, Ippolito (1996) has argued that firms may have used 401(k)s,
and matching, in particular, to direct additional compensation to workers with a low rate of time
preference as part of an optimal employee retention policy.11
New Evidence from the HRS
Overall, the arguments for and against the exogeneity of eligibility both have some
plausibility. Because it is very difficult to conceive of an empirical strategy (short of a

9

randomized trial) to illustrate convincingly the relationship (or lack thereof) between eligibility
and tastes, the current paper adopts the Poterba, Venti, and Wise eligibility experiment
methodology. It maintains the assertion that eligibility conditional on income and demographics
is not correlated with tastes for saving. An important contribution is to estimate the 401(k) saving
effect accounting for other public and private pension wealth. Specifically, it uses detailed data
on 401(k)s, other pensions, Social Security, and private wealth from Wave 1 of the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) and examines whether 401(k)s have stimulated retirement saving, more
broadly defined.12
The HRS has a number of advantages. First, it contains detailed data on household financial
and housing wealth. Arguably, they are as good or better than the SIPP data. Second, the study
obtained detailed information from both the respondent and employer on private pensions on
current and past jobs.13 Third, respondents were asked permission to link their survey responses
to administrative earnings histories and benefits records from the Social Security Administration
(SSA). With detailed financial, housing, pension, and Social Security wealth, the HRS is the only
household survey to give complete coverage of the household portfolio. Finally, the survey was
well timed. Because they were 51-61 in 1992, the main respondents were 40-50 in 1981, the
effective starting date for 401(k)s. Therefore, the HRS sample moved through their prime
retirement saving years during the expansion of the 401(k) program. Any 401(k) saving effect
should have been apparent in the HRS data.
The primary disadvantage is that the HRS only covers one birth cohort (i.e., those born
1931-41). The estimated saving effects may not apply to younger cohorts. This is discussed in
more detail in the conclusion.

10

Empirical Results with the Self-Reported Data

A sample of households from the 1992 HRS (Wave 1) was drawn. Each household contained
individuals with current jobs who reported they were not self-employed. This selection rule was
identical to that in Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994, 1995). The final sample consisted of 4,318
households. Overall, 35 percent of these households were 401(k) eligible and, as in other
studies, eligibility rose with household income. A detailed description of the sample and
eligibility are given in Appendix A.
Conditional median asset balances by eligibility and income categories for the HRS are
shown in Table 2. As in Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995), these were calculated using the median
regression parameter estimates from (2) evaluated at the sample mean of the demographic
variables. Importantly, their findings were replicated in the HRS. Across all income categories,
eligible households had greater total financial assets than ineligible households (panel A). These
differences were economically large and statistically significant. The p-value for the test of the
null hypothesis that this difference is zero is in square brackets. All p-values were based on
bootstrapped estimated variances with 300 replications. Also, the differences in non-IRA-401(k)
financial assets were small and not statistically significant (panel B). This suggests no
substitution within financial assets and that all 401(k) assets represented new saving.
However, the results change when the asset measure is total financial and private pension
assets (panel E). Pension assets are the present value of the household’s claims to assets in
defined benefit and defined contribution plans and the present value of any annuitized pensions.
It captures pension assets on current and past jobs and was calculated by Venti and Wise (1997)
from the self-reported pension information in Wave 1 of the HRS. For all income categories,
there are no statistically or economically significant differences between eligible and ineligible
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households. In addition, in four of the six categories, the economic differences are small.
Furthermore, in four categories, ineligible households actually have more assets than eligible
households. These findings are due to an inverse correlation between 401(k) eligibility and non401(k) pension assets (panel F). Ineligible households have much greater other pension wealth.
Once this other wealth is accounted for, the Poterba, Venti, and Wise results go away. 14
For each income category in Table 2, the panel E wealth differences are consistent estimates
of the true differences between eligible and ineligible households (under the identifying
assumption (3)). To evaluate the economic magnitude of these estimates and their implications
for aggregate household saving, the amount of new household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth
was calculated by dividing these estimates by the mean 401(k) balance for eligible households in
that category. 15 These quotients are shown at the bottom of the table. Four of the six estimates
are negative. The largest estimate is 54 cents for households with income greater than $75,000.
Because the household saving effects differed by income category, two weighted-average
saving effects are presented at the bottom of Table 2. The first calculates the average effect by
multiplying the income-category saving effects by income-category weights based on the
fraction of aggregate households in each category. These fractions, in turn, were calculated from
the HRS household analysis sampling weights. This “household-weighted” average new
household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth was -0.02. That is, the “average” household had a
401(k) household saving effect of minus 2 cents. The standard error associated with this estimate
was 48 cents. However, from a purely fiscal perspective, what matters is the impact of 401(k)s
on aggregate household saving. Even though 401(k)s appear to have decreased saving for lowerto-middle income households, these households may have accounted for a comparatively small
fraction of all dollars accumulated in 401(k)s. Specifically, households with income between
$20,000 and $75,000 accounted for 65.1 percent of all 401(k) households, but just 47.8 percent
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of all 401(k) wealth. Therefore, the second measure calculates the weighted-average effect by
multiplying the income-category saving effects by income-category weights based on the
fraction of aggregate 401(k) wealth (in dollars) in each income category. These fractions, in turn,
were calculated using both the sampling weights and the household 401(k) wealth data. This
“dollar-weighted” average new household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth was 0.15. That is,
15 cents of the average dollar in a 401(k) represented new household saving. The standard error
associated with this estimate was 31 cents. The 95 percent confidence interval for the household
saving effect is from minus 47 to 77 cents. This point estimate is significantly lower than that
implied by the Poterba, Venti, and Wise studies but happens to be similar to those in Engen and
Gale (2000).
Panels G through K give results for alternative asset categories. There was little difference in
the present value of claims to Social Security between eligible and ineligible households (panel
G).16

These balances are statistically different for three categories, but small in percentage

terms: eligible households had 5 to 8 percent more in Social Security assets than ineligible
households. Therefore, in terms of lifetime earnings, the two groups were similar. To the extent
unobserved heterogeneity, such as in the rate of time preference, is correlated with lifetime
earnings, this result gives some support to the assertion that eligibility was exogenous. Eligible
households had greater total financial and housing wealth than ineligible households (panel H).
This must be attributed to 401(k) assets, because the groups did not differ greatly in terms of
housing wealth (panel I). In particular, eligible households did not have significantly less
housing wealth than ineligible households. However, when other pension wealth is added and
total non-Social Security wealth is considered (panel J), there were no differences between
eligible and ineligible households. Finally, the asset measure in panel K is total wealth. It is the
sum of financial, housing, pension, and Social Security wealth. It is the broadest measure.
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Although for many income categories, eligible households have greater total wealth, these
differences are not statistically significant. There appears little evidence in favor of a 401(k)
saving effect at any income level.
Measurement Error in Eligibility
Like all of the previous literature, this analysis relied on self-reported 401(k) eligibility.
However, individuals may have misreported plan type. This could have happened for a number
of reasons: someone with a defined benefit reported a defined contribution plan (or vice versa);
someone with a non-401(k) defined contribution plan reported a 401(k); someone with a defined
benefit and 401(k) plan reported just the defined benefit plan, etc. In any of these (or the many
other possible) cases, 401(k) eligibility? the primary explanatory variable in equation (2)? was
measured incorrectly.
The HRS is well suited to address measurement error in eligibility. It administered a Pension
Provider Survey (PPS) to and attempted to obtain Summary Plan Descriptions (SPD) for all
pensions from employers of all individuals that self-reported a (current or past) pension-covered
job. The match rates were 65 percent of those currently working (in Wave 1) in pension-covered
jobs, 66 percent for the last job for those not working, and 35 percent for jobs held five years or
longer prior to the current (last) job for those working (not working).
To examine the extent of reporting error in 401(k) eligibility on the current job, Table 3
compares eligibility based on the matched firm-reported pension information with that from the
self-reported information.17 Results for the primary sample are shown in panel A. It contains all
observations from the self-reported sample (of 4,318 households) used above that had matched
firm pension records on all pension-covered jobs.18

Even though this is a strict criterion for

inclusion, it ensures a sample in which eligibility is measured precisely.19

Because of the less-

than-perfect match rates described above, this sample contains 1,312 of the 4,318 households in
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the self-reported data sample from above.20
The results in panel A indicate significant measurement error in self-reported 401(k)
eligibility on the current job. For all households with pension coverage on the current job,
43.4 percent were actually eligible based on the firm-reported data compared to 41.2 percent
with the self-reported data. However, this masks important variation in error across household
income categories. Lower-income households were more likely to have classified themselves
incorrectly as ineligible. This error was large. Actual eligibility averaged 8.5 percentage points
higher than self-reported eligibility for households with annual income under $40,000. This
represented a 21 percent difference in the two eligibility rates. In contrast, higher-income
households were more likely to have classified themselves incorrectly as eligible. This error was
large, too. Self-reported eligibility was 9.6 percentage points higher than actual eligibility for
households with annual income above $75,000.21 This represented a 20 percent difference in the
two eligibility rates. Similar results were obtained in panel B, where the sample selection
criterion was loosened to include all households with matched records on the current job.22
The type of error was striking as well. In panel A of Table 4, 37.3 percent of these
households correctly self-reported not eligible. In panel B, 21.9 percent correctly reported
eligible. However, 21.5 percent failed to self-report eligible when actually eligible (panel C). In
83 percent (i.e., 235/282=0.83) of these misclassified cases, the household reported a defined
benefit plan but not the 401(k).23 The other 17 percent of these cases (i.e., 47/282=0.17) involved
individuals who reported a non-401(k) defined contribution plan, such as a profit-sharing plan,
that actually was qualified legally under section 401(k) of the IRC because it provided for
voluntary employee contributions through salary reduction. About 19 percent of households
erroneously reported eligible when actually ineligible (panel D). Almost 64 percent (i.e.,
162/254=0.638) of these misclassified cases involved a household that reported a defined benefit
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plan and mistakenly reported a 401(k) plan.
Tables 3 and 4 indicate significant measurement error in self-reported 401(k) eligibility. This
is a very important finding because all of the previous literature has used self-reported data to
determine eligibility.24

Therefore, all previous estimates of the saving effect of 401(k)s

potentially were biased and inconsistent, and, at a minimum, should be viewed with caution.
Table 5 provides insight into the sign and relative magnitude of the bias. Households could
have reported pension information that classified them as eligible when actually ineligible.
Columns (1) and 2 show the percent of the subsample of 1,312 households with matched pension
records in each self-/firm-reported eligibility cell by household income category. Cell sizes are in
parentheses. In panel A, 12.9 percent of households with income less than $20,000 reported
eligible when actually ineligible. This figure rose with household income. In panel F,
26.9 percent of households with income greater than $75,000 reported eligible when actually
ineligible. In contrast, households could have reported not eligible when actually eligible. In
panel A, 22.1 percent of households with income less than $20,000 reported not eligible when
actually eligible. This figure fell with household income. In panel F, 17.3 percent of households
with income greater than $75,000 reported not eligible when actually eligible.
Columns (3) through (8) show the unconditional mean balances for three asset measures for
each eligibility cell. The unconditional median balances are in square brackets. The last line of
each panel shows the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test of the null hypothesis of
equal cell asset distributions. Failure to reject the null hypothesis is evidence that the
measurement error in eligibility was uncorrelated with saving behavior, which suggests previous
estimates of 401(k) saving effects with self-reported eligibility were consistent subject to the
identifying assumption (3). Interestingly, across household income categories in columns (3) and
(4), there were no statistically significant differences in the cell distributions of non-401(k)
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financial assets. This suggests that the measurement error in eligibility was not correlated with
non-401(k) financial asset saving. However, across household income categories in columns (5)
and (6), there were statistically significant differences in the cell distributions of total financial
assets. Both at the mean and median, households who reported not eligible, but were actually
eligible, had relatively low total financial assets.25

These “low” savers were attributed

erroneously to the ineligible group in analyses with self-reported eligibility. In contrast, both at
the mean and median, households who reported eligible, but were actually ineligible, had
relatively high total financial assets.26

These “high” savers were attributed erroneously to the

eligible group in analyses with self-reported eligibility. Heuristically, this clearly biased toward
finding a positive 401(k) saving effect when the test is based on total financial assets, as in the
previous literature.27
This description is heuristic because, technically, the bias from using self-reported eligibility
depends on the size of assets shifted between cells weighted by the percent of the sample in each
cell shown in columns (1) and (2). But as described above, the percent of the sample in each cell
changed as income rose. This implies that the bias is differential by income category. For
example, for households with income less than $20,000 (panel A), the “low” savers mistakenly
attributed to the ineligible group were 22.1 percent of the sample, whereas the “high” savers
mistakenly attributed to the eligible group were 12.9 percent of the sample. In comparison, for
households with income greater than $75,000 (panel F), the “low” savers mistakenly attributed to
the ineligible group in analyses with self-reported eligibility were 17.3 percent of the sample,
whereas the “high” savers mistakenly attributed to the eligible group were 26.9 percent of the
sample. So, the measurement error bias, while positive for all income categories, is expected to
be greater for higher-income households than lower-income households. This is born out in the
analysis of conditional median balances in Tables 6 and 7 below.
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Columns (7) and (8) of Table 5 suggest that the correlation of the measurement error and
saving is even more complex. These columns show mean and median cell balances for total
financial and pension assets. In four of the six household income categories, there are statistically
significant differences (at the 9 percent level or less) in the cell distributions of total financial and
pension assets. The largest p-value is only 0.20. This suggests that the measurement error is
correlated with total financial and pension asset saving. But the cell patterns across income
categories are now quite different than those in columns (5) and (6). For households with income
under $30,000, those who reported not eligible, but were actually eligible, had relatively high
median total financial and pension assets. This was because they had non-401(k) pension assets.
These tended to be households with a defined benefit plan and a 401(k) who did not report the
401(k). For households with income under $30,000, those who reported eligible, but were
actually ineligible, had relatively low total financial and pension assets. In contrast, for
households with income over $50,000, those who reported not eligible, but were actually
eligible, had relatively low median total financial and pension assets. For households with
income over $50,000, those who reported eligible, but were actually ineligible, had relatively
high total financial and pension assets.
Empirical Results with the Firm-Reported Eligibility
This section presents new estimates of the effect of 401(k)s on household saving using the
firm-reported eligibility in the HRS. The primary sample consists of the 1,312 households that
had matched firm pension records on all pension-covered jobs (i.e., those that appeared in panel
A of Table 3 and in Tables 4 and 5) plus all households that had no pension coverage during
their lifetime. These additional 925 households were ineligible for a 401(k) and had zero pension
wealth. Thus, the primary sample consists of 2,237 (=1,312+925) households, or 51.8 percent of
the original sample of 4,318 households used in analysis with the self-reported data in Table 2.
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Recall, there were no economic or statistically significant 401(k) effects in the self-reported
data in Table 2. As a benchmark, equation (2) was re-estimated using self-reported eligibility,
but on the sample of 2,237 households for which firm-reported eligibility is measured. The
implied conditional median total financial and pension assets by eligibility and income are
shown in Table 6. In general, the results are similar to those in Table 2. There are no differences
between eligible and ineligible households in non-401(k) financial assets and large differences in
total financial assets in panels B and A of Table 6, respectively. Panels C and D of Table 6 show
total financial and pension assets and non-401(k) pension assets, respectively. 28 Five of the six
differences were positive between eligible and ineligible households in total financial and
pension assets, but four of these were not statistically significant. There were statistically
significant differences for households with income in the $40,000-50,000 and $50,000-75,000
categories, but in the former, ineligible households actually had more assets than eligible
households. Across income categories, there is little statistical evidence of a 401(k) saving
effect.29
The amount of new household saving is shown at the bottom of the table. In contrast to
Table 2, five of these estimates are positive. However, the two statistically significant estimates,
for households with income between $40,000 and $50,000 and between $50,000 and $75,000,
respectively, are quite large in absolute value. To see this, let θ be the combined household
federal-state marginal tax rate on capital income. If each dollar of 401(k) wealth is new saving
and the full amount of the tax subsidy is saved, then plausible estimates of the saving effect
should be bounded above by 1 +θ . Conversely, if each dollar of 401(k) wealth would have been
saved otherwise and the full amount of the tax subsidy is consumed, then plausible estimates of
the saving effect should be bounded from below by - θ . The saving effect point estimate of 1.71
for households with income between $50,000 and $75,000 is larger than 1 +θ , when θ is
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evaluated at the sample mean for this income category, but not statistically significantly larger.
However, the saving effect point estimate of –3.06 for households with income between $40,000
and $50,000 is both economically and statistically significantly smaller than - θ .
Overall, in Table 6, the dollar-weighted new household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth
was $0.71. The standard error associated with this estimate was $0.45. In an absolute sense, this
estimate is much larger than that from Table 2 of $0.15. Gustman and Steinmeier (1999c) found
that the likelihood of having a matched firm pension record rose with household wealth.
Therefore, the subsample in Table 6 is composed of households with a relatively higher
proclivity toward saving than the full sample of households in Table 2. So, it is not surprising
that the point estimates of the saving effects are somewhat higher.
The analyses in Tables 3 through 5 predicted that measurement error in eligibility biased
upward the estimated 401(k) saving effect based on a comparison of total financial assets. To
isolate the effect of measurement error in eligibility on the estimates, Table 7 presents
conditional median asset balances by eligibility on the current job and household income
categories using firm-reported eligibility. That is, the only difference between Tables 6 and 7 is
in the measure of eligibility. A comparison of Tables 6 and 7 confirms this prediction. Like the
results in Table 6, those in panel A of Table 7 show that eligible households had greater total
financial assets than ineligible households in five of the six income categories. However, unlike
Table 6, the magnitudes of the differences were substantially less; in fact, between two and four
times less. In addition, only the difference for households with income less than $20,000 was
statistically significant.
Recall, that households who reported not eligible, but were actually eligible, had relatively
low total financial assets. These “low” savers were attributed erroneously to the ineligible group
with self-reported eligibility in Table 6. In Table 7, these households have been moved into the
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eligible group, and pulled down that group’s median. On the other hand, households who
reported eligible, but were actually ineligible, had relatively high total financial assets. These
“high” savers were attributed erroneously to the eligible group in Table 6. In Table 7, these
households have been moved into the ineligible group, and pulled up that group’s median.
Importantly, the assets that are being shifted in this case are truly non-401(k) pension assets that
households incorrectly self-reported as 401(k) assets because they misreported eligibility. Once
eligibility is measured correctly, the conditional medians were more similar, so much so that
there were no statistical differences for all income categories except the lowest. On an economic
basis, though, the differences in panel A still represent a substantial portion of mean 401(k)
wealth shown by income category at the bottom of the table.
Table 5 also showed that the measurement error in eligibility was uncorrelated with non401(k) financial asset saving. This was confirmed in panel B of Table 7. The differences in non401(k) financial assets were small, not statistically different from zero, and quite similar in
magnitude to those in Table 6.
A third prediction from Tables 3 through 5 was that the measurement error bias was
differential by income and dependent on non-401(k) pension assets. In panel C of Table 7, the
asset measure is total financial and pension assets. For the lower three income categories, eligible
households had higher balances than ineligible households, although the differences were
statistically different from zero only for households with income between $20,000 and $30,000.
In contrast, for the upper three income categories, eligible households had lower balances than
ineligible households, and the differences were statistically different from zero (at the 10 percent
level or less) for households with income between $40,000 and $50,000 and greater than
$75,000, respectively.
The implied saving effects are shown at the bottom of the table. They are quite large and
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positive for lower-income households and quite large and negative for higher-income
households. A comparison of these effects with those at the bottom of Table 6 indicates that
incorrect measurement of eligibility biased 401(k) saving effects based on total financial and
pension assets downward for lower-income households and upward for higher-income
households. Effectively, this tilted the estimated saving-income profile.
An examination of panels D in Tables 6 and 7, respectively, provides a clear explanation.
Households who reported not eligible, but were actually eligible, had significant non-401(k)
pension assets. Recall from Table 4 that these were predominantly households with defined
benefit plans and 401(k)s, but likely did not report being eligible because they were not
contributing to the 401(k). In Table 7, these households have been moved into the eligible group
and raised that group’s median non-401(k) pension assets (panel D). But because there were
relatively more of these households in the lower-income categories, as shown in Table 5, the
movement of these households into the eligible group had a larger effect in raising non-401(k)
pension assets for lower- than higher-income eligible households. On the other hand, households
who reported eligible, but were actually ineligible, had significant non-401(k) pension assets. In
Table 7, these households have been moved into the ineligible group and pulled up that group’s
median non-401(k) pension assets (panel D). But because there were relatively more of these
households in the higher-income categories, as shown in Table 5, the movement of these
households into the ineligible group had a larger effect in raising non-401(k) pension assets for
higher- than lower-income ineligible households. These differential effects clearly show how the
measurement error tilted the estimated saving-income profile. The dollar-weighted new
household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth in Table 7 is minus $1.28, with a standard error of
$0.68.
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Measurement Error in Pension Assets
The estimated saving effects shown at the bottom of Table 7 are quite large in absolute value.
Issues about precision notwithstanding, one might speculate that these estimates themselves
suggest a failed specification test for the eligibility experiment framework. However, like all of
the previous literature, the analysis in Tables 2 through 7 relied on self-reported pension assets.
The primary advantage of such assets is that they represent what the household believed its
pension entitlement to have been. To the extent forward-looking models of saving behavior are
based on expectations, then self-reported pension assets are an appropriate measure (Gale 1995,
1998; Lusardi 1999; Feldstein 1978).
Nonetheless, there are important reasons to believe that measurement error in pension assets
might be severe. First, individuals may not have reported plan values accurately. This may have
been especially severe for defined benefit plans which rely on sometimes complicated formulas
based on salary, age, years of service, early and normal retirement dates, etc., of which the
individual may not be well aware. Even small errors in reporting the early and normal retirement
dates can change the implied accrual profile and present value calculation dramatically. This
would have resulted in dependent variable measurement error for those specifications above
based on total financial and pension assets. Participants in defined contribution plans may have
had better knowledge of their account balances, and, hence, less reporting error for plan values.
Second, measurement error in reported plan type, as documented in Table 4, almost surely was
correlated highly with error in reported plan value. In this sense, the explanatory variable
measurement error likely exacerbated the dependent variable measurement error. Gustman and
Steinmeier (1999c) examined measurement error in the HRS pension data extensively and found
these patterns of measurement error in pension assets.30

Third, the self-reported pension assets

used above contained many missing values that ultimately were imputed. Specifically, Venti and
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Wise (1997) reported almost 40 percent of HRS households had to have had at least one piece of
information imputed in order to construct the self-reported pension wealth used. This resulted in
additional measurement error.
The key issue, then, is to determine the extent to which better measurement of pension assets
can make the estimates in Table 7 more plausible. In some respects, the HRS is well suited to
address measurement error in pension assets. It administered a Pension Provider Survey (PPS)
to, and attempted to obtain Summary Plan Descriptions (SPD) for all pensions from employers
of all individuals that self-reported a (current or past) pension-covered job. Importantly, these
matched firm data do not have individual-level information on contributions or balances, rather
only contain plan type, eligibility rules, benefit formulae, employer contribution rates, early and
normal retirement dates and other information described in the Summary Plan Description.
These are useful especially for the calculation of defined benefit assets and defined contribution
assets due to mandatory employer and employee contributions.
To gauge the importance of measurement error in pension assets, Table 8 presents
conditional median asset balances by firm-reported eligibility on the current job and household
income categories for the HRS firm-reported pension assets on the same sample of 2,237
households from Tables 6 and 7.31

The measure of pension assets is the present value of claims

to assets in defined benefit and defined contribution plans and the present value of any
annuitized pensions based on the firm-reported data. Specifically, it is pension wealth scenario 1
from the HRS Pension Present Value Database (Level 1) by Peticolas and Steinmeier (1999) and
is described in more detail in Appendix A.
The results in panel A show that eligible households had greater total financial assets than
ineligible households for the firm-reported sample. These differences were economically large
and statistically significant. Also, the differences in non-IRA-401(k) financial assets were small
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and not statistically significant (panel B). In panel C, the asset measure is total financial and
private pension assets. In contrast to the results in Tables 2, 6, and 7, there are statistically
significant differences in total financial and pension assets between eligible and ineligible
households in the lower-income categories. For example, 401(k)-eligible households with
incomes less than $20,000 had $7,134 more in total financial and pension assets than ineligible
households. This difference was statistically significant at the 7 percent level. Eligible
households with incomes in the $20,000-30,000 and the $30,000-$40,000 categories had $29,429
and $35,992, respectively, more in total financial and pension assets than ineligible households,
with both differences statistically significant. Although positive, there were no statistically
significant differences for the highest three income categories.
The estimates of new household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth are substantial for lowerto-middle income households: $0.91, $0.78, and $0.95 for households with income less than
$20,000, $20,000-30,000, and $30,000-40,000, respectively. Importantly, this effect attenuates
with income. For households with $50,000-75,000 in income, the household saving effect is
estimated as $0.01. Because the 401(k) tax subsidy rises with the marginal tax rate, and the
marginal tax rate rises with income, one might expect the saving effects to rise (not fall) with
income. However, because the annual 401(k) contribution limit is fixed and does not depend on
income, contributions are more likely to be infra-marginal as income rises. Hence, saving effects
might be expected to fall with income.32 This pattern in Table 8 of declining saving effects with
income is consistent with the recent findings of Engen and Gale (2000), who used self-reported
401(k) information from the SIPP. While large, the saving effects for the lower-to-middle
income households are similar in magnitude to those found by Engelhardt (1996) for a Canadian
tax subsidy to saving and Venti and Wise (1986, 1990b) for IRAs.33

The “dollar-weighted”

average new household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth was $0.38. That is, $0.38 of the
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average dollar in a 401(k) represented new household saving. The standard error associated with
this estimate was $0.16. The 95 percent confidence interval for the household saving effect is
from $0.06 to $0.70. This point estimate is significantly lower than that implied by the Poterba,
Venti, and Wise studies and slightly higher than the largest estimate ($0.30) in Engen and Gale
(2000).
Unfortunately, there is very little information in the matched firm records that would allow
for the accurate calculation of individual balances in voluntary contributory plans like 401(k)s.
Peticolas and Steinmeier (1999) calculated voluntary employee contributions by assuming that
the individual had contributed at the self-reported voluntary contribution rate in 1992 (Wave 1)
for each past year eligible (i.e., contribution rates were time-invariant).34 If the contribution rate
was missing in 1992, the individual was imputed to have contributed each year at a 5 percent
rate, the sample mean contribution rate for those with non-missing values. Clearly, these
assumptions likely mean that firm-reported exceeds actual 401(k) wealth. Indeed, for the
subsample of 257 households that both were self- and firm-reported 401(k)-eligible, the ratio of
sample mean firm- to self-reported 401(k) wealth was 2.6. In addition, 80 percent of these
households had firm-reported 401(k) wealth that exceeded self-reported 401(k) wealth.
There are some important implications. First, for households that correctly reported their
pension plan type, there likely was less measurement error in self-reported than firm-reported
defined contribution assets. Second, for those that incorrectly reported plan type, the firmreported defined contribution assets significantly overstate actual, but unobserved, defined
contribution assets. Third, if actual voluntary contribution rates varied around the average of 5
percent by income level (e.g., higher contribution rates at higher income levels), then the degree
of overstatement will be differential by income level. Finally, if the frequency of missing values
in contribution rates, and, therefore, imputations in the firm data, varied by income level (e.g.,
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more imputations at lower income levels), then the degree of overstatement will be differential
by income level.
Consequently, equation (2) was estimated using the following pension asset data (in the
dependent variable): firm-reported data for all defined benefit plans; firm-reported data for all
incorrectly self-reported defined contribution plans (i.e., reported a defined benefit when actually
had a defined contribution plan); and, self-reported data for all correctly self-reported defined
contribution plans. This minimizes the error in defined benefit and correctly self-reported
defined contribution assets. However, it should be emphasized that defined contribution assets
are still overstated for those that failed to correctly self-report defined contribution plans.
The conditional median total financial and pension assets by eligibility and income categories
are shown in Table 9. The differences between eligible and ineligible households are less
precisely estimated. Household saving effects from 401(k)s are large for lower-income
households and attenuate as income rises. In fact, 401(k)s crowd in saving at a ratio of 2.5:1 for
households with income under $20,000. These effects are even negative for higher-income
households, although not statistically different from zero. The estimated dollar-weighted average
household saving effect is minus $0.08 with a standard error of

$0.29. This is substantially

lower than the estimate of $0.38 in Table 8 that used firm-reported plan values for all
households. Importantly, a comparison of mean 401(k) wealth by income category in Tables 8
and 9 clearly shows that firm-reported 401(k) assets likely greatly overstates actual 401(k) assets.
The average ratio of mean 401(k) in Table 8 to Table 9 is 2:1.
Table 10 reports conditional median total financial and pension assets by eligibility and
income categories from the estimation of
7

7

7
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j =1

j=1

Aai = å β ajYij + å γ aj (Yij ´ DiEligible) +θ ' X i + å φ aj (Yij ´ DiDCError ) + ε ai .

(4)

Because defined contribution assets are overstated for those that failed to correctly self-report
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defined contribution plans, equation (4) modifies (2) by adding a dummy variable, DiDCError , that
is 1 if the household failed to correctly report a defined contribution plan and 0 otherwise. This
dummy directly accounts for this overstatement, and the effect is allowed to vary with income
category. The results are similar to those in Table 9. However, now the estimated saving effect in
the lowest income category, 1.04, is more plausible.35

Review of Evidence on Plan Substitution
Overall, the estimated effect of 401(k)s on household saving is small. Because there appears
to have been no substitution within financial assets and 401(k) eligibility was inversely
correlated with other pension assets, the results imply significant firm-level substitution of
401(k) for other pension assets. While this paper does not provide new direct evidence of
substitution in plan data, this section briefly discusses findings from the previous literature that
are not inconsistent with these findings.
One of the most striking developments in workplace compensation in the last two decades
has been the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pensions. As Figure 1 clearly
shows, participation in defined benefit plans has fallen dramatically, while that for defined
contribution plans, and 401(k)s, in particular, has risen dramatically. Although there is debate as
to the cause of this shift (Clark and McDermed 1990; Gustman and Steinmeier 1992; Kruse
1995). The figure makes it clear that, because most of the growth in defined contribution plans
has been due to 401(k)s, one potential explanation for the findings in Tables 2 and 6 through 10
is firm-level substitution of 401(k)s for other pensions.
Papke (1999) identified four pathways for plan substitution, of which three are explicit, and
the fourth, implicit. First, firms may have replaced existing defined benefit plans with 401(k)s.
Papke (1999) examined IRS Form 5500 filings for firms with defined benefit plans in 1985. She
compared those to the 1992 filings for the same firms. On average, for every defined benefit plan
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terminated, three 401(k) plans were created. This implied 33 percent substitution. 36 However,
Ippolito and Thompson (2000) argued that many of the “terminations” in the Form 5500 data
were due to corporate mergers, and that those plans survived but under new plan sponsors.
Specifically, they matched Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) case administration
files to the Form 5500 database and found that only about 5 percent of defined benefit plans were
terminated and replaced by 401(k)s in the 1987-1995 period.
Second, firms may have replaced existing defined contribution plans with 401(k)s. In
particular, many after-tax thrift and savings plans may have been converted to 401(k)s to capture
the benefits of pre-tax saving. Andrews (1992) has provided striking evidence of this from Form
5500 filings. Only 1,703 401(k) plans existed in 1983. In 1987, there were 45,054 such plans.
But of these, 15,689 had been established before 1984. This implied that 13,986 401(k) plans (or
31 percent) in 1987 were converted from some other pension type. Andrews claimed the bulk of
these conversions were from after-tax thrift plans. Papke (1999) has provided further evidence.
From 1985 to 1992, on average, for every defined contribution plan terminated, three 401(k)s
were created. The evidence of Andrews and Papke combined suggest a significant fraction of
401(k) plans have been converted from other pensions.
One shortcoming of these studies has been the focus on plan rather than pension asset
substitution. If the distribution of pension plan assets is skewed (to a relatively small number of
plans), there could have been little substitution of pension plan assets toward 401(k)s even if
many plans were substituted. Based on Form 5500 filings from 1984-95, Benjamin (2000)
calculated for 1992 that 32 percent of aggregate assets in 401(k) plans were converted from other
plans. Based on Form 5500 filings, Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996) reported that in 1985,
85 percent of 401(k) balances, 39 percent of plans, 65 percent of participants, and 66 percent of
contributions were from plans created before 1982 and thought to have been conversions of non-
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401(k) plans. However, these figures have declined in magnitude over time. Specifically, they
also reported that in 1991, the majority of balances, 42 percent of participants, and 47 percent of
contributions were from plans created before 1982 and thought to have been conversions of non401(k) plans.
Third, with the advent of 401(k)s, firms may have kept existing plans, but added 401(k)s as
supplements and channeled all additional pension resources to 401(k)s. In general, there has been
little convincing empirical evidence for this, although numerous anecdotes suggest some firms
capped existing defined benefit plans when they adopted a 401(k). However, Figure 1 plots the
time path of participation in supplemental defined contribution plans, most of which currently
are 401(k)s. Interestingly, the fraction of the work force covered by such plans has remained
remarkably constant across time. There was rise in such plans beginning in 1981, the year that
the IRS issued clarifying regulations for 401(k)s, but no growth since 1984. Although there may
be other interpretations, this may suggest most 401(k)s that currently are supplemental plans
were conversions. It also suggests that most of the growth in 401(k)s has been as primary plans.
Fourth, new firms since (or existing firms predating) the expansion of 401(k)s in 1981, first
deciding to offer a pension after 1981 may have adopted 401(k)s when they otherwise would
have adopted a defined benefit or non-401(k) defined contribution plan in the absence of the
401(k) program. This can be characterized as implicit substitution. Unfortunately, because this is
a counterfactual, it is not possible to know the magnitude of this form of substitution, although
one interpretation of Figure 1 suggests that this might have been large. However, given the
debate in the pension literature over the causes of the shift from defined benefit to defined
contribution plans, other interpretations may apply.
The results in Tables 2 and 6 through 10 suggested significant substitution of 401(k) for other
pension assets. The evidence from the existing literature using Form 5500 data is mixed. It
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appears unlikely there was substantial explicit substitution of 401(k) for defined benefit plans. In
contrast, it appears likely there was significant substitution of 401(k) for after-tax thrift plans.
What is critical, but not known, is what firms that offered 401(k) plans would have done in the
absence of the 401(k) program. If most would have offered a non-401(k) defined contribution or
defined benefit plan, then the scope for implicit substitution is large. Overall, I conclude that the
findings from the previous literature on plan substitution are not inconsistent with the results in
the current paper, but that more research with plan data is clearly needed.

Conclusion
The paper has a number of very important implications for research on pensions and saving.
First, 401(k) eligibility is not exogenous with respect to other pensions. There appears to have
been significant substitution of 401(k) for other pension assets. The incorporation of all pension
assets gives a decidedly dimmer view of the household saving effects from 401(k)s. Second,
measurement error in eligibility matters. All of the previous literature used self-reported
eligibility, which exhibits significant measurement error. This error has biased the estimated
401(k) saving effects upward significantly and differentially by income category. Third,
measurement error in pension assets matters. The combination of correctly measured eligibility
and self-reported pension assets yielded quite large results. Better results were obtained only
when pension assets were measured more accurately. Fourth, access to matched firm pension
records is critical for the analysis of pensions and saving. Finally, and ironically, perhaps the
greatest weakness of this study is that even for all its emphasis on the importance of
measurement error, in the end, 401(k) wealth, the object of study, is the most poorly measured.
This highlights the need for improvements in survey methodology to better measure 401(k)
pension assets.
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Overall, the best estimates in this paper suggest that effect of 401(k)s on household saving is
small. Unfortunately, the estimate most favorable to a modest saving effect ($0.38 in Table 8)
used the least plausible firm-reported pension assets. All of the estimates are significantly lower
than those implied by the Poterba, Venti, and Wise studies but happen to be similar to those in
Engen and Gale (2000). They also contrast with the findings of Engelhardt (1996) and Venti and
Wise (1986, 1990) for other tax subsidies to saving. 37 One conceivable explanation for the large
estimated offset to household saving is firm-level substitution of 401(k)s for other pensions. In
addition, even though very little of the average dollar of 401(k) wealth appears to be new
household saving, specifications in which eligibility and pension assets were more accurately
measured

(Tables 8 through 10) indicated 401(k)s may have stimulated saving significantly for

lower-to-middle income households and, hence, increased retirement income security for an
important segment of the population.
There are important caveats to this study. First, the HRS samples used consist primarily of
individuals born in 1931-41. Because households of all ages were not included, this study’s
findings may not apply to other, particularly younger, birth cohorts, for which it is possible there
may be larger saving effects. Second, the estimated saving effects in the best specifications
(Tables 8 through 10) showed some sensitivity to how pension assets were measured. Because
there is currently no completely acceptable way to measure pension assets, especially 401(k)
assets, it is conceivable that alternative measures of pension assets not used here could imply a
positive true saving effect, although the results in this paper make it likely to be small. Finally,
because it is very difficult to conceive of an empirical strategy to illustrate convincingly there is
no relationship between 401(k) eligibility and tastes for saving, this study adopted the eligibility
experiment methodology. Specifically, it maintained the assertion that eligibility conditional on
income and demographics is not correlated with tastes for saving. It should be emphasized that
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many of the criticisms of this approach in the previous literature still may be valid here.
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TABLE 1. Conditional Median Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility and
Income: Poterba, Venti, and Wise Results from the 1991 SIPP
Annual Household Income
Asset Category and
(thousands of dollars)
Eligibility Status
<10
10-20
20-30
30-40
40-50
A. Total financial assets
Eligible for a 401(k)
Not eligible for a 401(k)

2,033
1,378

B. Non-IRA-401(k) assets
Eligible for a 401(k)
Not eligible for a 401(k)

50-75

>75

4,045*
1,997

5,499*
2,558

8,683*
3,256

14,470*
6,206

26,093*
10,080

51,080*
29,842

538
663

1,138
1,063

1,500
1,411

2,835*
2,052

4,724
4,250

8,699*
5,437

18,188*
17,000

C. 401(k) Assets
Eligible for a 401(k)
Not eligible for a 401(k)

1,171
0

1,008
0

1,211
0

2,092
0

3,073*
0

4,833*
0

14,300*
0

D. IRA assets
Eligible for a 401(k)
Not eligible for a 401(k)

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

1,437
978

6,029*
2,882

*

0
0

Difference between eligibles and non-eligibles is significant at the 5 percent significance level.
Source: Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995), Table 3, panel (a).
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TABLE 2. Conditional Median Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility and Income:
Results from Self-Reported HRS Data
Annual Household Income
Asset Category and
(thousands of dollars)
Eligibility Status
<20
20-30
30-40
40-50
50-75
A. Total financial assets
Eligible
9,457
16,235
30,011
29,708
62,318
Not eligible
4,559
6,606
10,509
13,755
27,129
Difference
[p-value]
B.Non-IRA-401(k) financial assets
Eligible
Not eligible
Difference
[p-value]
C. 401(k) Assets
Eligible
Not eligible
Difference
[p-value]
D. IRA assets
Eligible
Not eligible
Difference
[p-value]
E. Total financial and pension assets
Eligible
Not eligible
Difference
[p-value]
F. Non-401(k) pension assets
Eligible
Not eligible
Difference
[p-value]

118,204
52,659

4,898
[0.0001]

9,629
[0.0001]

19,502
[0.00001]

15,953
[0.0004]

2,465
2,378

4,148
3,811

7,449
6,076

8,949
7,065

14,972
12,835

28,919
24,486

87
[0.81]

337
[0.61]

1,373
[0.23]

1,885
[0.36]

2,137
[0.31]

4,434
[0.46]

1,145
0

4,754
0

8,271
0

6,725
0

15,317
0

29,669
0

1,145
[0.00001]

4,754
[0.00001]

8,271
[0.00001]

6,725
[000001]

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

35,189
[0.00001]

>75

15,317
[0.00001]

65,545
[0.00001]

29,669
[0.00001]

6,000
3,000

20,000
13,000

3,000
[0.19]

7,000
[0.05]

0
[0.85]

0
[1.00]

0
[1.00]

0
[1.00]

25,297
23,222

44,075
46,006

69,997
72,520

86,431
100,942

152,843
158,401

331,149
293,752

2,075
[0.43]

-1,931
[0.96]

-2,523
[0.88]

-14,511
[0.51]

-5,558
[0.88]

37,397
[0.28]

6,601
9,000

8,900
19,775

14,332
45,764

29,037
63,787

75,910
84,502

164,898
176,837

2,399
[0.09]

-10,875
[0.01]

-31,432
[0.00001]

-34,750
[0.005]

-8,592
[0.47]

-11,939
[0.68]
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Asset Category and
Eligibility Status
G. Social Security Assets
Eligible
Not eligible
Difference
[p-value]
H. Financial and Housing Wealth
Eligible
Not eligible
Difference
[p-value]
I. Housing Wealth
Eligible
Not eligible
Difference
[p-value]
J. Non-Social Security Wealth
Eligible
Not eligible
Difference
[p-value]
K. Total Wealth
Eligible
Not eligible
Difference
[p-value]
Mean 401(k) Wealth for
Eligible Households

TABLE 2. (Continued)
Annual Household Income
(thousands of dollars)
<20
20-30
30-40
40-50

50-75

>75

103,529
98,198

117,137
115,385

130,185
124,391

140,813
134,077

147,876
138,882

157,309
144,337

5,331
[0.03]

1,752
[0.56]

5,794
[0.18]

6,734
[0.12]

8,994
[0.004]

12,972
[0.02]

44,489
29,202

55,403
46,611

77,901
59,475

81,838
66,953

130,589
83,650

214,723
142,754

15,287
[0.16]

8,792
[0.33]

18,426
[0.06]

14,885
[0.30]

46,939
[0.00001]

71,969
[0.004]

27,640
18,298

32,790
34,563

42,374
38,515

58,001
46,470

75,081
64,012

9,432
[0.01]

-1,773
[0.67]

3,859
[0.46]

-7,748
[0.14]

11,531
[0.005]

11,069
[0.15]

75,908
62,340

108,704
107,307

153,447
153,660

165,019
196,343

271,702
260,721

517,663
459,940

13,518
[0.41]

1,397
[0.98]

-213
[0.99]

-31,324
[0.50]

10,981
[0.77]

57,723
[0.29]

184,005
163,319

231,427
218,828

282,346
282,530

304,325
329,114

408,602
400,531

659,054
595,120

20,686
[0.53]

12,599
[0.61]

-186
[0.99]

-24,789
[0.44]

8,071
[0.82]

63,934
[0.33]

8,034

10,882

15,839

21,611

37,987

69,572

-0.16
New Household Saving per
0.26
-0.18
Dollar of 401(k) Wealth
Household-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth
Dollar-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth

40,467
48,215

-0.67

-0.15

0.54
-0.02
(0.48)
0.15
(0.31)
4,318

Number of Observations
Notes: Conditional median asset balances derived from the parameter estimates from equation (2) evaluated at the
sample means of the demographic variables for the sample of 4,318 households defined in the text. The estimates in
panels G and K were over a sample of 3,927 households. Standard errors are in parentheses. p-values for the test of the
null hypothesis of no difference in assets are in square brackets. Standard errors and p-values are based on bootstrapped
estimated variances with 300 replications. New household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth is the difference in total
financial and pension assets between eligible and ineligible households divided by the mean 401(k) wealth for eligible
households from the self-reported data for each income category, respectively.
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Table 3. Self-Reported Versus Firm-Reported 401(k) Eligibility for Households with
Pension Coverage on the Current Job By Household Income Category
(in percent)
Annual Household Income
(thousands of dollars)
All
< 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
50 to 75
Data Source
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
A. Households with Matches on Current and Past Jobs
Self-Reported
41.2
30.7
35.9
33.2
37.1
48.0
43.4
39.9
44.0
41.9
41.3
44.0
Firm-Reported

Self-Reported
Firm-Reported

41.7
45.0

28.1
40.1

B. Households with Match on Current Job
36.1
35.0
37.3
48.5
45.5
44.6
42.0
45.2

> 75
(7)
57.7
48.1

55.9
50.8

Notes: Author’s calculations based on the sample of 1,312 households with matched firm pension records on
current and past jobs in panel A and the sample of 2,248 households with matched firm pension records on the
current job in panel B. Data sources for self- and firm-reported eligibility are described in Appendix A.
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Table 4. Type of Measurement Error for Pension on Current Job
Sample: 1,312 Households with Matches on Current and Past Jobs
Self-/Firm-Reported 401(k)
Eligibility Category
A. Self-Reported Not Eligible, FirmReported Not Eligible

Percent of Sample
in Category
37.3

Number of Observations
in Category
489

B.

Self-Reported Eligible, Firm-Reported
Eligible

21.9

287

C.

Self-Reported Not Eligible, FirmReported Eligible

21.5

282

1.

Self-reported defined benefit plan,
failed to report 401(k) plan

17.9

235

2.

Self-reported defined contribution
plan, failed to report 401(k) plan

3.6

47

19.3

254

12.3

162

D. Self-Reported Eligible, Firm-Reported
Not Eligible
1.

Self-reported defined benefit plan,
erroneously reported 401(k) plan

7.0
92
Self-reported defined contribution
plan, erroneously reported 401(k)
plan
Notes: Author’s calculations based on the sample of 1,312 households with matched firm pension
records on current and past jobs. Similar results were obtained in the sample of 2,248 households
with matched firm pension records on the current job and are not shown. Data sources for self- and
firm-reported eligibility are described in Appendix A.
2.
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Table 5. Mean and Median Assets by Measurement Error Cell and Household Income Category
Sample: Households with Matches on Current and Past Jobs
Percent of Sample in Cell
(Cell Size)

Self-Reported Eligibility Category
A. Households with Income < $20,000
Not Eligible
Eligible

Not Eligible
(1)

Eligible
(2)

47.2
(77)
12.9
(21)

22.1
(36)
17.8
(29)

Mean [Median] NonMean [Median] Total
401(k) Financial Assets
Financial Assets
Firm-Reported Eligibility Category
Not Eligible
Eligible
Not Eligible
Eligible
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
10,018
[500]
12,007
[50]

p-Value for Test of Equal Asset Distributions
B. Households with $30,000 in Income
Not Eligible
Eligible

0.19

38.3
(80)
17.7
(37)

25.8
(54)
18.2
(38)

14,520
[2,050]
8,248
[3,000]

p-Value for Test of Equal Asset Distributions
C. Households with $30,000-$40,000 in income
Not Eligible
Eligible

p-Value for Test of Equal Asset Distributions

10,995
[250]
17,271
[1,500]

26.3
(57)
15.7
(34)

13,377
[2,500]
8,204
[2,000]

17,239
[6,500]
40,627
[10,100]

Eligible
(8)

55,521
[39,474]
43,289
[7,325]

46,729
[25,691]
43,841
[21,128]

19,383
[3,000]
23,736
[18,300]

0.05

19,271
[4,750]
23,629
[12,000]

69,712
[53,626]
52,404
[32,500]

0.0001

21,231
[6,000]
23,276
[5,040]
0.38

16,842
[250]
25,863
[7,004]

Not Eligible
(7)

0.0001

0.77

40.5
(88)
17.5
(38)

15,451
[500]
22,593
[3,000]

Mean [Median] Total
Financial and Pension
Assets

23,034
[11,625]
73,123
[44,000]
0.0001

70,802
[50,097]
51,304
[35,868]
0.14

31,731
[9,000]
60,638
[26,911]

149,700
[132,488]
130,865
[100,087]

131,236
[94,968]
98,816
[68,385]
0.09

Table 5. (Continued )
Sample: Households with Matches on Current and Past Jobs
Percent of Sample in Cell
(Cell Size)

Self-Reported Eligibility Category
D. Households with $40,000-$50,000 in income
Not Eligible
Eligible

Not Eligible
(1)

Eligible
(2)

42.2
(90)
16.4
(35)

20.7
(44)
20.7
(44)

Mean [Median] NonMean [Median] Total
401(k) Financial Assets
Financial Assets
Firm-Reported Eligibility Category
Not Eligible
Eligible
Not Eligible
Eligible
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
23,640
[6,000]
34,761
[10,000]

p-Value for Test of Equal Asset Distributions
E. Households with $50,000-$75,000 in income
Not Eligible
Eligible

0.77

33.8
(102)
22.2
(67)

18.2
(55)
25.8
(78)

41,345
[11,700]
74,688
[17,000]

p-Value for Test of Equal Asset Distributions
F. Households with income > $75,000
Not Eligible
Eligible

22,055
[9,750]
21,917
[8,075]

17.3
(36)
30.8
(64)

87,835
[25,000]
135,570
[35,800]

35,351
[17,250]
47,876
[28,177]

0.0001

44,184
[17,000]
49,106
[14,750]
0.43

25.0
(52)
26.9
(56)

33,785
[12,000]
81,554
[40,000]

59,974
[20,500]
86,507
[69,500]

Mean [Median] Total
Financial and Pension
Assets
Not Eligible
(7)

Eligible
(8)

208,952
[202,596]
207,314
[175,150]

180,995
[166,410]
112,996
[79,985]

0.001

61,222
[26,500]
103,472
[70,000]

274,408
[254,846]
272,990
[272,668]

0.0001

91,482
[37,500]
69,670
[40,000]

142,431
[67,500]
266,847
[115,000]

214,759
[170,000]
257,098
[189,828]
0.20

117,549
[50,350]
176,810
[129,000]

514,778
[484,480]
654,293
[551,299]

530,408
[328,625]
397,145
[319,425]

p-Value for Test of Equal Asset Distributions
0.86
0.003
0.003
Notes: Columns (1) and 2 show the percent of the sample of 1,312 households with matched pension records in each self-/firm-reported eligibility cell by household
income category. Cell sizes are in parentheses. Columns (3) through (8) show the unconditional mean balances for three asset measures for each eligibility cell. The
unconditional median balances are in square brackets. The last line of each panel shows the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test of the null hypothesis of
equal cell asset distributions. Failure to reject the null hypothesis is evidence that the measurement error in eligibility was uncorrelated with saving behavior.
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Table 6. Conditional Median Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility on Current Job and
Household Income Category: HRS Results with Self-Reported Pension Assets and Self-Reported
Eligibility on the Firm-Reported Sample
Annual Household Income
Dependent Variable and
(thousands of dollars)
Eligibility on Current Job
< 20
20-30
30-40
40-50
50-75
> 75
A. Total Financial Assets
Eligible
4,843
13,477
28,607
28,839
64,324
123,208
Not Eligible
2,559
5,303
11,083
12,277
24,496
58,005
Difference
[p-value]

2,284
[0.04]

8,174
[0.004]

17,524
[0.06]

16,562
[0.01]

39,828
[0.0001]

65,203
[0.004]

2,875
2,881

7,753
6,652

6,032
6,295

14,386
12,449

39,018
26,707

167
[0.39]

-6
[0.99]

1,100
[0.57]

-264
[0.93]

1,937
[0.56]

12,311
[0.19]

C. Total Financial and Pension Assets
Eligible
17,003
Not Eligible
15,991

39,014
37,342

88,310
73,264

86,820
142,190

224,536
168,383

388,101
325,295

1,012
[0.39]

1,672
[0.80]

15,045
[0.39]

-55,369
[0.05]

55,152
[0.03]

62,805
[0.28]

3,308
3,953

4,867
10,208

17,965
45,207

37,464
99,266

123,588
111,727

237,618
193,501

Difference
[p-value]

-645
[0.31]

-5,342
[0.68]

-27,243
[0.39]

-61,802
[0.22]

11,862
[0.69]

44,117
[0.28]

Mean 401(k) Wealth for
Eligible Households

3,243

10,285

22,979

18,120

32,274

79,123

New Household Saving Per
Dollar of 401(k) Wealth

0.31

0.16

0.65

-3.06

1.71

0.79

B. Non-IRA-401(k) Financial Asset
Eligible
1,731
Not Eligible
1,564
Difference
[p-value]

Difference
[p-value]
D. Non-401(k) Pension Assets
Eligible
Not Eligible

Household-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth

0.32
(0.38)
Dollar-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth
0.71
(0.45)
Number of Observations
2,237
Notes: Conditional median asset balances derived from the parameter estimates from equation (2) evaluated
at the sample means of the demographic variables for the sample of 2,237 households defined in the text.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The p-values for the test of the null hypothesis of no difference in assets
are in square brackets. Standard errors and p-values based on bootstrapped estimated variances with 300
replications. New household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth is the difference in total financial and
pension assets between eligible and ineligible households divided by the mean 401(k) wealth for eligible
households from the self-reported data for each income category, respectively.

Table 7. Conditional Medi an Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility on Current Job and
Household Income Category: HRS Results with Self-Reported Pension Assets and Firm-Reported
Eligibility on the Firm-Reported Sample
Annual Household Income
Dependent Variable and
(thousands of dollars)
Eligibility on Current Job
< 20
20-30
30-40
40-50
50-75
> 75
A. Total Financial Assets
Eligible
3,781
7,615
13,662
21,077
44,942
95,939
Not Eligible
2,538
5,615
16,787
15,729
33,703
79,433
Difference
[p-value]

1,243
[0.03]

2,000
[0.20]

-3,125
[0.47]

5,348
[0.23]

11,239
[0.28]

16,506
[0.51]

B. Non-IRA-401(k) Financial Asset
Eligible
1,674
Not Eligible
1,602

2,646
2,906

6,528
7,904

6,976
6,118

13,654
12,409

34,336
28,130

72
[0.77]

-260
[0.79]

-1,376
[0.44]

858
[0.72]

1,245
[0.70]

11,206
[0.27]

C. Total Financial and Pension Assets
Eligible
20,635
Not Eligible
15,068

49,635
31,341

78,743
74,510

91,891
136,812

178,047
193,971

325,658
404,010

5,567
[0.42]

18,294
[0.01]

4,233
[0.80]

-44,921
[0.10]

-15,924
[0.55]

-78,352
[0.06]

4,526
3,679

26,075
5,820

48,829
26,282

64,346
81,374

106,780
123,728

188,231
227,800

Difference
[p-value]

847
[0.37]

20,255
[0.005]

22,547
[0.05]

-17,028
[0.45]

-16,948
[0.38]

-39,579
[0.36]

Mean 401(k) Wealth for
Eligible Households

1,714

5,338

9,170

6,506

21,928

43,417

New Household Saving Per
Dollar of 401(k) Wealth

3.25

3.42

0.46

-6.90

-0.73

-1.80

Difference
[p-value]

Difference
[p-value]
D. Non-401(k) Pension Assets
Eligible
Not Eligible

Household-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth

-0.49
(1.00)
Dollar-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth
-1.28
(0.68)
Number of Observations
2,237
Notes: Conditional median asset balances derived from the parameter estimates from equation (2) evaluated
at the sample means of the demographic variables for the sample of 2,237 households defined in the text.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The p-values for the test of the null hypothesis of no difference in assets
are in square brackets. Standard errors and p-values based on bootstrapped estimated variances with 300
replications. New household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth is the difference in total financial and
pension assets between eligible and ineligible households divided by the mean 401(k) wealth for eligible
households from the self-reported data for each income category, respectively.
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Table 8. Conditional Median Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility on Current Job and
Household Income Category: HRS Results with Firm-Reported Pension Assets and Eligibility
Annual Household Income
Dependent Variable and
(thousands of dollars)
Eligibility on Current Job
< 20
20-30
30-40
40-50
50-75
> 75
A. Total Financial Assets
Eligible
5,836
22,659
46,919
39,034
95,508
165,739
Not Eligible
2,374
4,875
13,795
12,037
24,668
60,068
Difference
[p-value]

3,462
[0.15]

17,784
[0.01]

22,124
[0.001]

26,997
[0.001]

70,840
[0.0002]

105,671
[0.002]

B. Non-IRA-401(k) Financial Asset
Eligible
1,674
Not Eligible
1,602

2,646
2,906

6,528
7,904

6,976
6,118

13,654
12,409

34,336
28,130

72
[0.77]

-260
[0.79]

-1,376
[0.44]

858
[0.72]

1,245
[0.70]

11,206
[0.27]

C. Total Financial and Pension Assets
Eligible
17,594
Not Eligible
10,458

59,747
30,318

101,788
65,796

102,983
80,606

161,702
160,624

366,021
305,863

Difference
[p-value]

Difference
[p-value]

7,134
[0.07]

29,429
[0.02]

35,992
[0.003]

22,377
[0.26]

1,078
[0.97]

60,158
[0.18]

Mean 401(k) Wealth for
Eligible Households

7,867

37,978

37,895

41,877

76,799

164,378

New Household Saving Per
Dollar of 401(k) Wealth

0.91

0.78

0.95

0.53

0.01

0.37

Household-Weighted Average New Household Saving Per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth

0.52
(0.15)
Dollar-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth
0.38
(0.16)
Number of Observations
2,237
Notes: Conditional median asset balances derived from the parameter estimates from equation (2) evaluated
at the sample means of the demographic variables for the sample of 2,237 households defined in the text.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The p-values for the test of the null hypothesis of no difference in assets
are in square brackets. Standard errors and p-values based on bootstrapped estimated variances with 300
replications. New household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth is the difference in total financial and
pension assets between eligible and ineligible households divided by the mean 401(k) wealth for eligible
households from the firm-reported data for each income category, respectively.
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Table 9. Conditional Median Total Financial and Pension Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility on
Current Job and Household Income Category:
Results for the Integration of Firm- and Self-Reported Pension Assets
Annual Household Income
(thousands of dollars)
Eligibility on Current Job
< 20
20-30
30-40
40-50
50-75
> 75
45,591
Eligible
17,691
84,485
85,214
141,642
284,184
30,167
Not Eligible
10,424
63,738
87,051
160,395
305,499
Difference
[p-value]

7,267
[0.01]

15,424
[0.23]

20,747
[0.39]

-1,837
[0.83]

-18,753
[0.04]

-21,315
[0.80]

Mean 401(k) Wealth for
Eligible Households

2,874

19,769

23,463

20,070

38,422

85,997

New Household Saving Per
Dollar of 401(k) Wealth

2.53

0.78

0.88

-0.09

-0.49

-0.25

Household-Weighted Average New Household Saving Per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth

0.35
(0.29)
Dollar-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth
-0.08
(0.29)
Number of Observations
2,237
Notes: Conditional median asset balances derived from the parameter estimates from equation (2) evaluated
at the sample means of the demographic variables for the sample of 2,237 households defined in the text.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The p-values for the test of the null hypothesis of no difference in assets
are in square brackets. Standard errors and p-values based on bootstrapped estimated variances with 300
replications. New household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth is the difference in total financial and
pension assets between eligible and ineligible households divided by the mean 401(k) wealth for eligible
households from the firm-reported data for each income category, respectively.
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Table 10. Conditional Median Total Financial and Pension Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility on
Current Job and Household Income Category: Results for the Integration of Firm- and Self-Reported
Pension Assets, Controlling for Error in Reported Defined Contribution Plan
Annual Household Income
(thousands of dollars)
Eligibility on Current Job
< 20
20-30
30-40
40-50
50-75
> 75
Eligible
12,625
41,395
65,253
86,205
133,687
268,849
Not Eligible
9,625
25,534
48,026
87,245
157,108
282,126
Difference
[p-value]

3,000
[0.41]

15,861
[0.28]

17,227
[0.41]

-1,040
[0.96]

-23,421
[0.40]

-13,277
[0.76]

Mean 401(k) Wealth for
Eligible Households

2,874

19,769

23,463

20,070

38,422

85,997

New Household Saving Per
Dollar of 401(k) Wealth

1.04

0.80

0.73

-0.05

-0.61

-0.15

Household-Weighted Average New Household Saving Per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth

0.17
(0.32)
Dollar-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth
-0.09
(0.34)
Number of Observations
2,237
Notes: Conditional median asset balances derived from the parameter estimates from equation (2) evaluated
at the sample means of the demographic variables for the sample of 2,237 households defined in the text.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The p-values for the test of the null hypothesis of no difference in assets
are in square brackets. Standard errors and p-values based on bootstrapped estimated variances with 300
replications. New household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth is the difference in total financial and
pension assets between eligible and ineligible households divided by the mean 401(k) wealth for eligible
households from the firm-reported data for each income category, respectively.
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Appendix A: Data and Variable Descriptions
Self-Reported Information on 401(k)-Type Arrangements - Detailed questions on
pensions on the current job were posed to respondents and spouses in Section F of the HRS
questionnaire. Individuals were asked first if they were “included” in a pension, retirement, or
tax-deferred savings plan (Question F37):

“Now I'd like to ask about pension or retirement plans on your job, sponsored by
your employer or union. This includes not only basic pension or retirement plans,
but also tax-deferred plans like thrift, savings, 401k, deferred profit sharing, or
stock ownership plans. Are you included in any such pension, retirement, or taxdeferred plan with this employer? [IF RESPONDENT MENTIONS IRA OR
KEOGH PLANS, NOTE IN MARGIN AND SAY: “We will ask about these later
in the interview. Here, I just want to find out about other plans operated through
your employer.”]”
If the individual answered “yes,” then detailed questions followed about each plan for that job,
up to 3 plans. This self-reported information included the type of plan, e.g., formula-based (DB),
account-based (DC), or combination. 38
Those with a DC plan were asked to identify the type. The questionnaire listed five potential
answers: thrift or savings; 401(k)/403(b)/SRA; profit-sharing; stock purchase/employee stock
option (ESOP); and other.39 In the public use version of the HRS, the “other” category responses
were coded: annuity (including tax-deferred, such as TIAA-CREF); money purchase plan; IRASEP; simplified employee pension plan (SEPP); combinations of 401(k)/403(b)/SRA and profitsharing; combinations of thrift or savings and stock purchase/ESOP; combinations of
401(k)/403(b)/SRA and stock purchase/ESOP; and, other. In the current paper, plans selfreported as combinations of 401(k)/403(b)/SRA and thrift or savings were considered 401(k)type arrangements. This is the same definition as used by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994, 1995).
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Those self-reported as combinations of profit-sharing and stock purchase/ESOP were considered
profit-sharing plans.
For those individuals not “included” in a pension or retirement plan (Question F37), some
additional questions followed (Questions F37a-f). The sequence of these questions is depicted in
Figure A-1. These included whether the employer offered any such plans (Question F37a) and, if
so, whether the individual was eligible to be included in these plans (Question F37b).40
Unfortunately, the HRS did not ask what type of plans these were. However, tabulations in the
1995 Survey of Consumer Finances found over 80 percent of individuals that reported they were
not “included” in, but were eligible for, a pension were actually eligible for a 401(k). Pence
(1999) had a similar finding. Therefore, all HRS individuals that reported they were not included
but were offered a pension plan were deemed 401(k)-eligible.
Sample Selection and Comparison of Self-Reported 401(k) Eligibility - A sample of
households from the 1992 HRS (Wave 1) was drawn. Each household contained individuals with
a current job who reported they were not self-employed (Question F3). This selection rule was
identical to that in Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995). The final sample consisted of 4,318
households. Using the HRS household-level analysis weights, these households represented
10,267,886 aggregate households age 51-61. Of these, 1463 were eligible for a 401(k)-type
arrangement. Using the HRS household-level analysis weights, these households represented
3,580,927 aggregate households age 51-61.
The first row of panel A of Table A-1 shows the percentage of households eligible for a
401(k) under this paper’s definition. All figures were calculated using the HRS household-level
analysis sampling weights. Overall, 35 percent of households 51 to 61 years old were eligible.
Similar to the findings of previous studies, such as Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994, 1995,
1998a), eligibility rose with household income. Importantly, these tabulations are broadly
consistent with those for households of similar age shown in rows 2-5 of panel A from various
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Waves of the SIPP and CPS done by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995, 1998a). This gives some
confidence that the measurement method for eligibility was not unreasonable.
The first row of panel B shows the percentage of eligible households that participated in a
401(k), where “participated” means having made a contribution to a 401(k) during the survey
year.41 Almost 74 percent of eligible households 51 to 61 years old participated. In addition, the
first row in panel C shows the percentage of all households that participated. About 26 percent of
these households participated. Similar to the findings of previous studies, participation measured
in panels B and C rose with household income. These tabulations are broadly consistent with
those for households of similar age from various Waves of the SIPP and CPS. As a comparison,
panel D shows the percentage of households with an IRA. A total of 44.5 percent of households
51 to 61 had an IRA. IRA participation rose with income as well. A comparison of panels C and
D indicates that overall more households participated in IRA's than in 401(k)s. However, a
comparison of panels B and D indicates that participation was greater for 401(k)s than IRAs
among eligible households.
Self-Reported Pension Assets – Self-reported pension assets are the present value of the
household’s claims to assets in defined benefit and defined contribution plans and the present
value of any annuitized pensions. It captures pension assets on current and past jobs. It was
calculated by Venti and Wise (1997) from the self-reported pension information in Wave 1 of
the HRS.
Firm-Reported Pension Information – The HRS administered a Pension Provider Survey
(PPS) to and attempted to obtain Summary Plan Descriptions (SPD) for all pensions from
employers of all individuals that self-reported working in a pension-covered job.42 Specifically,
for those working in Wave 1, the current employer and the employer from the most recent past
job that lasted at least five years were contacted. For those retired, the last employer and the
employer from the most recent job that lasted at least five years prior to the last were contacted.
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In terms of the HRS survey instrument, these employers corresponded to the pension-covered job
in Section F and the first pension-covered job in section H for those working in Wave 1, and to
the pension-covered job in Section G and the first pension-covered job in Section H for those
retired in Wave 1. Employers from the second and third jobs in Section H were not contacted.
See Gustman and Steinmeier (1999c) for a detailed explanation. The match rates were 65 percent
(or 2,896 jobs) of those working in pension-covered jobs in Wave 1, 66 percent (or 915 jobs) for
the last job for those not working in Wave 1, and 35 percent (or 994 jobs) for jobs held five years
or longer prior to the current (last) job for those working (not working). These matched firm data
do not have individual-level information on contributions or balances, rather only contain plan
type, eligibility rules, benefit formulae, employer contribution rates, early and normal retirement
dates and other information described in the Summary Plan Description.
Social Security Assets - The measure used came from two sources. First, there were matched
Social Security earnings histories for 9,029 respondents. For these individuals, Social Security
wealth came from the restricted access Earnings and Benefits File (EBF) for the 1992 HRS from
the Social Research Center at the University of Michigan. The calculation of the Social Security
assets in the EBF is described in Mitchell, Olson, and Steinmeier (1996). For individuals without
matched records, Social Security wealth was imputed using self-reported information on
earnings histories in the 1992 and 1996 HRS (Waves 1 and 3) following the method in Gustman
and Steinmeier (1999a).
Firm-Reported 401(k) Eligibility - Peticolas (1999) developed a dataset of variables from the
matched firm data that indicated whether the individual had been eligible for a tax-deferred
voluntary retirement savings plan. For each pension, it was determined whether the employer
provided such a plan and whether it had been available to the individual at the time of the Wave
1 interview for current jobs and at the time of past employment for past jobs. For the purposes of
this study, those cases that were determined definitively that the individual had been eligible for
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such a plan were deemed “401(k)-eligible” based on the firm data. Specifically, I used the
“Deferred Tax Voluntary Retirement Savings Available” flag in the Peticolas (1999) data to
measure 401(k) eligibility. There are cases, particularly for matched records with past employers,
in which tax-deferred retirement savings plans were introduced after the individual left the firm
(measured by the “Plan Inception Subsequent to Respondent’s Tenure” variable) as well as cases
in which there was not enough information in the matched records to determine definitively
whether such a plan had been available (measured by the “Insufficient Information to Determine
Availability” variable). These variables were not used to determine 401(k) eligibility.
Firm-Reported Pension Assets - This measure is the present value of claims to assets in
defined benefit and defined contribution plans and the present value of any annuitized pensions
based on the firm-reported data. It is from the Pension Present Value Database (Level 1) by
Peticolas and Steinmeier (1999). This database contains the present value of claims to pensions
under nine different interest rate/wage growth/inflation scenarios. Present values used here were
calculated according to the baseline scenario (Scenario 1) that assumed a nominal interest rate of
6.3 percent, annual nominal wage growth of 5 percent, and annual inflation rate of 4 percent. The
other eight scenarios represent departures from this baseline. See Peticolas and Steinmeier
(1999) for details. It should be emphasized that the firm-reported data may provide a rather poor
measure of DC wealth. The firm-reported data do not have individual-level information on
contributions or balances in DC plans. Instead, they only contain DC plan type (401(k), non401(k), etc.), eligibility rules, employer contribution rates, etc. There is very little information
that would allow for the accurate calculation of individual balances in voluntary contributory
plans such as 401(k)s.
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1992 HRS
1991 SIPP
1991 SIPP
1993 SIPP
1993 CPS

51 to 61
45 to 55
55 to 65
51 to 61
51 to 61

TABLE A-1
IRA and 401(k) Participation Rates and Eligibility by Age
and Income Category and Surveya
Annual Household Income
(thousands of dollars)
Less
All
than 10 10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
50 to 75
(1)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(2)
A. Percentage of Households Eligible for a 401(k)
35.3
7.2
21.4
25.6
32.2
39.5
46.1
35.9
2.1
16.5
27.6
32.8
48.7
56.4
28.9
7.9
14.4
20.9
36.5
37.7
51.9
39.1
------------45.6
-------------

1992 HRS
1991 SIPP
1991 SIPP
1993 SIPP
1993 CPS

51 to 61
45 to 55
55 to 65
51 to 61
51 to 61

73.8
72.3
72.3
66.9
77.0

1992 HRS
1991 SIPP
1991 SIPP
1993 SIPP
1993 CPS

51 to 61
45 to 55
55 to 65
51 to 61
51 to 61

25.9
25.9
20.9
26.1
33.0

Survey

Age
Category

B. Percentage of Eligible Households Participating in a 401(k)
31.7
52.5
72.1
72.6
69.4
78.5
72.5
51.5
57.6
58.5
81.6
75.1
85.2
68.3
49.0
72.5
67.8
84.0
-------------------------

2.3
1.5
6.7
-----

C. Percentage of Households Participating in a 401(k)
11.2
18.4
23.2
27.3
35.9
8.5
15.9
19.2
39.8
42.3
9.8
10.2
26.5
25.6
43.6
---------------------

More
than 75
(8)
55.9
52.5
37.0
-----

82.9
88.1
85.7
-----

46.0
46.3
31.7
-----

D. Percentage of Households with an IRA
1992 HRS
51 to 61
44.5
13.3
22.2
31.4
42.1
46.9
58.7
73.6
1991 SIPP
45 to 55
35.3
6.0
12.9
24.9
31.3
47.3
50.2
66.3
14.8
24.1
37.6
45.7
59.5
63.4
75.5
1991 SIPP
55 to 65
43.8
a
Following Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994), participation is defined as the household having made a contribution
to a 401(k) during the survey year. Tabulations are weighted using the HRS household-level analysis weights and
based on the sample of 4,318 HRS households described in the text. When weighted, this sample represents
10,267,886 aggregate households aged 51 to 61 in1992. The 1991 SIPP tabulations are from Poterba, Venti, and
Wise (1995), Table 2. The 1993 SIPP and CPS tabulations are from Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1997), Table 6.
Annual household income is in thousands of nominal dollars.
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Appendix B: Additional Sensitivity Analysis
This appendix presents the results of additional specifications that used firm-reported pension
assets. First, all analyses in the previous literature, and up to here in this paper, have defined
401(k) eligibility based on the pension plan on the current job. However, as time has elapsed
since the effective inception of 401(k)s in 1981, it is increasingly likely that as individuals
changed jobs, they may not have been eligible based on the current job, but nonetheless have had
exposure to 401(k)s due to eligibility on past jobs. Because the HRS obtained matched records
for pensions on past jobs, the definition of eligibility can be redefined to all households that were
ever eligible, i.e., on either the current or past jobs. This was done and equation (2) was reestimated using the new eligibility measure on the sample of 2,237 households used. This did not
change any of the results.
Second, two criteria for inclusion in the samples used in Tables 6 through 10 were that
individuals in the household had a current job and were not self-employed.43

Whereas the

omission of the self-employed is defensible in this context, many households were excluded
because of the lack of a current job due to retirement. Because the 401(k) tax subsidy to saving
produces a substitution effect that raises saving and an income effect that may induce retirement
(Feldstein 1974), it is possible that some households that were 401(k)-eligible in a past job do
not appear in the sample because they had retired. Furthermore, if these households were
differentially higher savers because of 401(k)s, then the results in Tables 6 through 10 may be
underestimates of the true household saving effects because the sample selection criteria would
have differentially excluded high-saving 401(k)-eligible households.
To explore this hypothesis, all retired households that were not self-employed on the job
prior to retirement and had matched firm records for their past pension-covered jobs were added
back into the firm-reported sample. This new sample was composed of the base sample of
2,237 households plus 1,015 retired households, for a total of 3,252 households. Equation (2)
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was re-estimated using the eligibility on either the current or past job on the new sample of 3,252
households. The results were similar. The estimated household saving effects were somewhat
higher for the higher-income categories but not as precisely estimated. Overall, there did not
appear to be strong support for the hypothesis that the estimated household saving effects were
biased downward due to the exclusion of retired households.44
Third, the sample used in Tables 6 through 10 contained all households that had matched
firm pension records on all pension-covered jobs. Although it ensured a sample in which 401(k)
eligibility and pension wealth were measured precisely, this was a strict criterion for inclusion
because of the low match rate (35 percent) on past pension-covered jobs. Consequently, a new
sample was formed that contained all households that had matched firm pension records on just
the current pension-covered job.45 This expanded the sample from 2,237 to 3,173 households.
The results from the replication of Tables 8 through 10 with the expanded sample did not differ
qualitatively from those with the smaller sample. In general, the differences between eligible and
ineligible households were less precisely estimated. Household saving effects from 401(k)s were
large for lower-income households and attenuate as income rises. The earlier results appeared
robust to changes in the sample selection criteria.
Finally, as described in Appendix A, all HRS individuals that reported they were not
“included” in a pension plan but were offered a pension plan were deemed 401(k)-eligible for the
samples in Tables 2-10. Because 401(k) eligibility cannot be determined truly for this group of
households, all models were re-estimated excluding this group of households and the results did
not change.
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Appendix C: The Effect of 401(k)s on National Saving

This appendix presents stylized estimates of the government revenue loss from the provision
of 401(k)s under the assumption that the household saving effect is the upper-bound estimate of
$0.38 per dollar of 401(k) wealth as in Table 8. This effect on government saving then is added
to the household saving gain to calculate the effect on national saving.
Estimation of the revenue loss is difficult for a number of reasons. First, the annual revenue
loss depends on the point in the lifecycle. Because each dollar contributed is tax-deductible, the
government loses revenue in the year of contribution. The revenue loss continues as long as the
individual works and contributions accrue at the pre-tax interest rate. But when the individual
retires, withdrawals are taxable as ordinary income and government revenue is positive. In
addition, marginal tax rates are typically lower when retired than working, so that withdrawals
are taxed at a lower rate than when the contributions were made. All of this requires the revenue
calculations be done in present value. Second, as is well known in the literature on IRAs and
401(k)s, the present value of the revenue loss depends crucially on the discount rate and the
marginal tax rates when working and retired. Third, as Feldstein (1995) and Hubbard and
Skinner (1996) persuasively argued and illustrated, the revenue loss critically depends on how
much 401(k)s add to the capital stock and generate additional corporate income tax revenue.
The calculation of the revenue loss follows Feldstein (1995) and the description in this
paragraph paraphrases his exposition. 46 Consider an individual that begins a 401(k) at age α ,
retires at age 65, and dies at age 79. Let t index age, t = α ,...,79 . The individual contributes Ct
to a 401(k) through age 64 and zero thereafter. At retirement, the stock of 401(k) wealth is used
to finance a constant annual withdrawal, Rt , through age 79. There are no pre-retirement
withdrawals.47 Let θ t , r , and τ denote the individual’s marginal personal income tax rate, the
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real pre-tax rate of return on additions to the corporate capital stock, and the marginal corporate
income tax rate, respectively. Assume an economy without growth and that all additions to the
corporate capital stock are through equity. Then Feldstein (1995) derived the revenue effect by
age, Tt , as
Tt = -θ t [C t - Rt + (1- τ )rBt ] + τ ( At - Bt )r .

(3)

At is wealth accumulated in the 401(k) and is defined as
At = [1 + (1 -τ )r] At-1 + Ct - Rt .

(4)

Bt is the counterfactual capital stock, i.e., the capital stock that would have been accumulated in
the absence of 401(k)s had Ct been contributed to a taxable savings vehicle.48 It is defined as
Bt = [1 + (1- θ t )(1 -τ )r]Bt-1 + λCt -Wt .

(5)

Define κ as the fraction of a dollar of 401(k) wealth that is new saving. λ is the fraction of a
dollar of 401(k) wealth that would have been saved otherwise, i.e., in the absence of 401(k)s.
Thus, λ = 1 - κ . Finally, the counterfactual stock of wealth is used to finance a constant annual
withdrawal, Wt , through age 79. The terminal conditions are A79 = 0 and B79 = 0 , respectively.
Equation (3) can be modified slightly to
Tt = -θ t Ct + θ t Rt -θ t [(1- τ )rBt ] + τ ( At - Bt )r

(6)

to make clear the per period sources of revenue loss. The first term of the right-hand side of (6) is
the revenue loss from the personal income tax while the individual works because annual
contributions are tax-deductible. The second term is the revenue gain from the personal income
tax in retirement because withdrawals are fully taxable. The third term is the revenue loss from
the personal income tax while working because 401(k) funds accumulate at the real pre-tax rate
of return. The final term is the revenue gain from the corporate income tax due to additions to the
corporate capital stock.

55

Given parameters values (α ,τ , r,θ t , λ) , equations (3)-(5) and the terminal conditions
describe Tt , the age-profile of the revenue loss from the provision of 401(k)s. Because the
estimated household saving effects, κ , in Table 8, as well as marginal personal income tax rates,
θ t , vary by household income, an age-profile of the revenue loss was calculated for each
household income category in Table 8. Specifically, the system was parameterized by household
income category for a representative household according to the category means of the sample
used in Table 8. First, the average age of the head of household in the sample was 55 and did not
vary across income categories. Second, following Hubbard and Skinner (1996), who based their
calculations on Employee Benefit Research Institute (1994) and Siegel (1992), r was assumed
to be 5.55 percent, the average portfolio return from 1900-1990, and constant across income
categories. Third, it was assumed that the representative household had been eligible for the
401(k) for six years as of 1992, i.e., it began contributing at age 49 (or in 1986), so α = 49 .49
Fourth, a constant real path of contributions when working was assumed, i.e., Ct = C . For
each income category, the contribution amount was set so that, at the real pre-tax return, r , A55
would match the category mean 401(k) wealth for eligible households at age 55 in the HRS.
Fifth, for each income category, λ was set equal to one minus that category’s estimated
household saving effect in Table 8.
The marginal tax rates are key parameters in the revenue calculations. For each income
category, the marginal personal income tax rate, θ , was assumed to be constant while working
and equal to the income category mean federal marginal tax rate on the first-dollar of household
capital income in Wave 1 (i.e., 1992) of the HRS. The rate was calculated for each household
using Internet TAXSIM at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Unfortunately, there has
been very little empirical analysis of the extent to which marginal tax rates decline at retirement.
One exception is Burman, Gale, and Weiner (1998). They used a large panel of income tax
56

returns from the Continuous Work History Survey (CWHS) that allowed them to hold household
characteristics fixed. They calculated marginal tax rates on IRA contributions and withdrawals
by income category under a number of different tax law, contribution, and withdrawal scenarios.
To measure how much marginal tax rates fall at retirement, for each income category, I used the
percentage difference between marginal tax rates for households that contributed in 1982 and
withdrew in 1995 but were treated as if the 1995 tax law had applied in 1982. These were taken
from Burman, Gale, and Weiner (1998), Table 3. These “constant-law” marginal tax rates
provide a clean measure of the effect of retirement on marginal tax rates holding household
characteristics and tax law fixed. For each income category, I then multiplied the marginal
personal income tax rate while working (defined above) by the respective percentage decline in
marginal tax rates to generate a first-dollar marginal tax rate on capital income while retired.50
This tax rate was assumed to be constant while retired.
Because Tt varies with point in the lifecycle and the household saving effects in Table 8
applied to a sample in which the average age of the head of 401(k)-eligible households was 55,
the revenue loss is calculated in present value at age 55 for each income category. Following
Hubbard and Skinner (1996), the discount rate used was 5.55 percent. Finally, for each income
category, the present value of the revenue loss is expressed as a fraction of that category’s mean
401(k) wealth for eligible households. This yields the present value of the revenue loss per dollar
of 401(k) wealth, which is shown in Table C-1 under three different corporate income tax
scenarios.
Panel A shows the case in which the marginal corporate income tax rate is zero. This is a
baseline in the sense that the effect of 401(k)s on government saving is constrained to come from
the personal income tax only. The dollar–weighted average household saving effect is $0.38. The
dollar-weighted average government saving effect is –$0.37. Therefore, the dollar-weighted
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average effect of 401(k)s on national saving is 1 cent. That is, 401(k)s break even with respect to
the personal income tax.
However, panel A ignores the fact that the household saving effect increases the corporate
capital stock, which generates new corporate income tax revenue. In panels B and C, the impact
on government saving is recalculated to reflect this corporate tax effect. As noted in Feldstein
(1995) and Hubbard and Skinner (1996), spillovers to the corporate tax significantly reduce the
revenue loss from 401(k)s. The results in panel B assumed an effective marginal corporate
income tax rate of 17 percent. This was half of the statutory rate of 34 percent that applied in
1992. In panel B, the dollar-weighted average government saving effect is –$0.27. Therefore, the
dollar-weighted average effect of 401(k)s on national saving is $0.11. The results in panel C
assumed the effective marginal corporate income tax rate equaled the statutory rate. In panel C,
the dollar-weighted average government saving effect is –$0.13. Therefore, the dollar-weighted
average effect of 401(k)s on national saving is $0.25.
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Saving
Measure
Household
Government
National

Household
Government
National

TABLE C-1
Estimates of New National Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth by Household
Income Category and Effective Corporate Marginal Income Tax Rate
Annual Household Income
(thousands of dollars)
HouseholdWeighted
< 20
20-30
30-40
40-50
50-75
> 75
Average
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
A. Zero Effective Corporate Marginal Income Tax Rate
0.91
0.78
0.95
0.53
0.01
0.37
0.52
-0.06
-0.18
-0.17
-0.29
-0.52
-0.39
-0.30
0.85
0.60
0.78
0.24
-0.51
-0.02
0.22

0.91
0.16
1.07

B. 17 Percent Effective Corporate Marginal Income Tax Rate
0.78
0.95
0.53
0.01
0.37
0.52
0.01
0.06
-0.15
-0.49
-0.30
-0.17
0.79
1.01
0.38
-0.48
0.07
0.35

DollarWeighted
Average
0.38
-0.37
0.01

0.38
-0.27
0.11

C. 34 Percent Effective Corporate Marginal Income Tax Rate
Household
0.91
0.78
0.95
0.53
0.01
0.37
0.52
0.38
Government
0.37
0.19
0.27
-0.03
-0.46
-0.21
-0.03
-0.13
National
1.28
0.97
1.22
0.50
-0.45
0.16
0.49
0.25
Notes: The new household saving estimates are from Table 8. The government saving estimates represent the
present value at age 55 of the annual gain in federal government revenue from the provision of 401(k)s
relative to a taxable savings instrument per dollar of 401(k) wealth. Their calculation follows Feldstein (1995)
and is described in Appendix C. Negative government saving means a loss in government revenue. The new
national saving is the sum of the household and government saving estimates and is expressed per dollar of
401(k) wealth. The statutory corporate marginal income tax rate in 1992 was 34 percent.
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Endnotes
1.

These figures are the author’s calculations from U.S. Department of Labor (2000). See
Turner and Beller (1992) and Employee Benefit Research Institute (1995) for excellent
discussions of trends in retirement benefits. Poterba (1994a), Papke (1999), Papke,
Petersen, and Poterba (1996), Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996), Hubbard and Skinner
(1996), and Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996, 1998a, 1998b) analyzed aspects of the
growth in 401(k)s relative to other retirement saving vehicles.

2.

These methods are described in detail in Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996, 1998a).

3.

Specifically, they argued that eligibility was exogenous conditional on income. This is
discussed in more detail in the text below.

4.

In fact, Bernheim (1999) interpreted this evidence as consistent with 401(k)s having
crowded in saving at ratios greater than 1:1.

5.

In principle, housing equity can finance retirement consumption, although, in practice,
the elderly spend down very little housing equity (Venti and Wise 1984, 1989, 1990a,
1991).

6.

They found similar results for 1987.

7.

See Bernheim (1999) and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996), for example.

8.

Private wealth was defined as the sum of financial and housing assets less the sum of
financial and mortgage debt.

9.

Pence (1999) and Sabelhaus and Ayotte (1999), who used the Surveys of Consumer
Finances (SCF), and Bernheim and Garrett (1996), who used a Merrill Lynch survey,
have been exceptions.

10.

This and other mechanisms for explicit and implicit firm-level substitution of 401(k)s for
other pensions are discussed in Section 5 below.

11.

Pence (1999) has represented one of the few attempts to control directly for tastes for
saving in the eligibility experiment framework. She used the 1995 Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF), which asked a set of qualitative questions on reasons for saving
(retirement, emergencies, kids’ education, or, don’t save), risk-taking (above average
risks, average risks, no risks), planning horizon (short-term, medium-term, long-term),
bequest expectations, and uncertainty about the economy. Consistently, eligible
households more frequently reported they saved for retirement, had a longer planning
horizon, and took greater risks than ineligible households. In addition, eligible
households were less likely to have reported they did not save and were uncertain about
the economy. Her estimates for (2) using the SCF confirmed the Poterba, Venti, and Wise
findings for total financial assets. However, when a set of dummy variables for responses
to the qualitative questions were added to the specification to control directly for tastes
for saving, the estimated difference in total financial assets between eligible and
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ineligible households fell by about 25 percent and frequently was no longer statistically
significant. These results can be interpreted in a number of ways. Naturally, they suggest
eligibility is correlated with a taste for saving. However, two of the three reasons most
highly correlated with eligibility were “reported saving for retirement” and “had a longer
planning horizon.” It is conceivable that the eligible households gave these answers
because they were eligible for a 401(k). That is, the “treatment” of 401(k) eligibility itself
may have affected attitudes toward retirement saving and planning. In the end, it is not
possible to separately identify whether these qualitative responses reflect tastes for saving
independent of eligibility.
12.

The HRS is a longitudinal study of a sample of individuals age 51-61 in 1992. These
individuals and spouses (regardless of the spouse’s age) were included in the study. There
were a total of 12,652 individuals in the first Wave (1992) that comprised 7,607
households. Detailed descriptions, discussion, and background information on the
structure of the HRS can be found in Moon and Juster (1995), Smith (1995), Gustman
and Steinmeier (1999a, 1999b), and Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick, and Steinmeier (1999).

13.

These data are described in detail in Appendix A. Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick, and
Steinmeier (1999) and Gustman and Steinmeier (1999c) have provided comprehensive
evaluations of this information.

14.

Similar results using mean regression are available from the author upon request.

15.

This follows the method in Engelhardt (1996).

16.

These data are described in Appendix A. Because not all respondents gave permission to
match Social Security records, the estimates in panels G and K were over a slightly
smaller sample of 3,927 households. When all specifications in Table 2 were run over
this sample of 3,927 households, the results did not change.

17.

The firm-reported eligibility measure is described in Appendix A.

18.

That is, if an individual had two pension-covered jobs, then matched records were needed
on both jobs for the individual to have entered this sample. For married households, both
spouses needed to have met this criterion.

19.

The sample will be broadened in the sensitivity analysis below.

20.

Of the 4,318 households in the sample for the self-reported data analysis in Table 2, only
3,013 were in pension-covered current jobs. So the 1,312 households just described
represent 43.5 percent of comparable households in Table 2.

21.

Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994, 1995) motivated their specification in equation (2) by the
fact that even though eligibility (self-reported in the SIPP) rose with income, conditional
on income, eligibility was unrelated to demographic factors, such as age. Table 3 shows
that actual eligibility for those that were pension covered on the current job was
remarkably even across household income categories. It is only when households that had
no pension coverage during their lifetime are added to the samples in panels A and B,
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respectively, that eligibility rises with income (obviously, these additional households
were ineligible for a 401(k) and have zero pension wealth). Expanding the sample in
panel A with these additional households, the eligibility rates for the six income
categories in ascending order are 15.7, 27.1, 31.0, 36.2, 37.4, and 40.8 percent,
respectively. This implies that the positive eligibility-household income profile is solely
due to differences across household income categories in the rate of pension coverage, a
fact pointed out by Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994).
22.

That is, the difference between the samples in panels A and B is that panel A required
matched records on all pension-covered jobs (current or past), whereas panel B required a
match on just the pension-covered current job. This expanded the sample significantly
because, as described above, the match rate was lowest on pensions from past jobs.

23.

One plausible explanation for this failure is that individuals eligible for, but not
voluntarily contributing to, the 401(k) may have neglected to report the 401(k) as a
separate plan in Section F of the survey.

24.

Gustman and Steinmeier (1999b) in the HRS used matched firm-records to estimate the
offset to household saving from private pensions, but did not focus on 401(k)s
specifically.

25.

Indeed, they appear similar to those who correctly reported they were ineligible.

26.

Indeed, they appear similar to those who correctly reported they were eligible.

27.

Note that the difference between non-401(k) and total financial assets is 401(k) assets
(and IRAs). This implies that the assets that are being shifted between cells in columns 5
and 6 due to the measurement error are truly non-401(k) pension assets that households
incorrectly self-reported as 401(k) assets.

28.

The conditional median balances for these asset categories are somewhat higher in Table
6 than Table 2 for the four largest income categories. This is consistent with Gustman and
Steinmeier (1999c) who found that, even conditional on income and other factors, the
probability of a household having had a matched firm pension record increased nonlinearly with the amount of self-reported pension assets.

29.

Table 2 presented results for additional measures of wealth, including Social Security.
Results for additional measures of wealth that included non-financial assets, such as
housing, were similar to those in Table 2 and not reported. The restricted data access
agreement governing the use of the HRS firm pension records and Social Security
records does not allow the firm-reported 401(k) eligibility measures from Peticolas
(1999) to be linked to the Social Security wealth data. Hence, estimation with wealth
measures that included Social Security could not be performed.

30.

Mitchell (1988), Gustman and Steinmeier (1989), Starr-McCluer and Sunden (1999) have
examined error in self-reported pension values in the SCF.
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31.

As above, these were calculated using the median regression parameter estimates from
(2) evaluated at the mean of the demographic variables in the firm-reported sample.

32.

Because the data used here are cross-sectional, there is no independent variation in
marginal tax rates with which to identify and test for the effect of a rising tax rate-saving
effect profile as just discussed. However, Engelhardt (1996) found that the saving effects
from a Canadian tax subsidy rose with marginal tax rates.

33.

However, the estimates for IRAs have been a subject of much debate (Bernheim 1997,
1999; Hubbard and Skinner 1996; Poterba, Venti, and Wise 1996, 1998a; Engen, Gale,
and Scholz 1996).

34.

See Madrian and Shea (2000) and Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1998) for analyses of
401(k) contribution behavior across time.

35.

Appendix B describes sensitivity analysis of the results in Tables 8 through 10 to a
number of alternative specifications and samples. The results were very robust.

36.

Papke, Petersen, and Poterba (1996) also examined 401(k) substitution for defined
benefit plans. They found very little substitution based on a mail/phone survey of 43
firms. Unfortunately, these firms represented just 5.5 percent of the 786 firms contacted
in the original survey. Although the results are interesting, the low response rate raises
concerns about how their results generalize to the population of firms.

37.

Because the best estimates in this paper suggest that 401(k)s have not raised household
saving, the effect on national saving was not explored because it would be expected to be
zero or even negative. However, Appendix C does present the results of stylized
simulations of the effect on government revenue and national saving for the upper-bound
household saving estimate of $0.38 from Table 8. The interested reader is referred there.

38.

In addition, questions were asked about the number of years included in the plan, the
amount of the employer contribution, the amount of the employee contribution, and the
balance in the plan. If the individual had more than three plans on the current job, then
the sum of the balances on the fourth and higher plans was asked as well.

39.

If the response fell in the “other” category, the type of plan was noted.

40.

The actual wording for these questions was “Does your employer offer any such plans?”
and “Are you eligible to be included in any of these plans?,” respectively.

41.

Alternatively, a household could have been defined as having participated if it had had a
positive 401(k) balance regardless of current contribution status. The first definition was
adopted to be consistent with previous studies.

42.

Unfortunately, the HRS did not contact employers of individuals that self-reported no
pension coverage on the job, so that the firm-reported data cannot shed light on the extent
to which individuals misreported their pension coverage status on the job.
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43.

These were criteria used by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994, 1995) and, in the current
paper, were chosen to make the sample(s) consistent with those used in the previous
literature.

44.

However, it should be emphasized that this can be viewed as a low-powered test of this
hypothesis simply because the retired households may have been spending down their
assets in retirement.

45.

That is, if an individual had two pension-covered jobs, then a matched record was needed
only on the current job for the individual to have entered the new sample. For married
households, both spouses needed to have met this new criterion.

46.

Feldstein (1995) analyzed the revenue loss from fully tax-deductible IRA’s, but his
method is applicable to 401(k)s as well.

47.

See Engelhardt (1999b), Korczyk (1996), and Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1998c) for
analyses of pre-retirement lump-sum pension distributions in the HRS.

48.

I assume that the alternative to a 401(k) is saving in an after-tax saving vehicle, rather
than, say, a fully-tax-deductible IRA. In practice, eligibility for fully-deductible IRA’s is
limited by household adjusted gross income. See Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995) and
Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994) for analytical comparisons between IRA’s, 401(k)s, and
after-tax saving vehicles, as well as empirical analyses of IRA-401(k) asset substitution.

49.

This corresponded to the sample mean number of years that households self-reported in
Section F they had been “included” in their 401(k).

50.

Burman, Gale, and Weiner (1998) also calculated marginal tax rates on contributions and
withdrawals by age category. As a sensitivity check, I used the percentage difference in
these to construct marginal tax rates when retired and these revenue simulations produced
results very similar to those in Table C-1.
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